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HUMAN FACTORS IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 
SUMMARY 
In this thesis, an investigation is done on human factor errors in aircraft 
maintenance, the methods of identifiying these errors, studies done on the subject 
up to date including the results that have been obtained and the applications for 
future use of aircraft maintenance facilities to protect them from human factor errors. 
Finally a real life example is analyzed using six sigma approach and the  
improvements obtained are demonstrated. We will also look at the statistics of 
human errors in aircraft maintenance and explore the current HF programs adopted 
by several organizations and try to understand why HF error occur, and how 
comprehensive, the solutions currently adopted. 
Aircraft maintenance is an essential component of the aviation system which 
supports the global aviation industry. As air traffic grows and the stringent 
requirements of commercial schedules impose increased demands upon aircraft 
utilization, the pressures on maintenance operations for on-time performance will 
also continue to escalate. This will open further windows of opportunity for human 
error and subsequent breakdowns in the system's safety net. It is also beyond 
question that unless the aviation industry learns from these occurrences, 
maintenance-related safety breakdowns will continue to occur. From a Human 
Factors perspective, important truths have been uncovered during the investigation 
of these occurrences [17]. 
 
Keywords: aircraft, aviation, error, human factor, maintenance, six sigma 
Science Code: 618.01.05 
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HAVA ARACI BAKIMINDA İNSAN FAKTÖRLERİ 
ÖZET 
Bu tezde havaaracı bakımında yer alan personelin sebep olduğu hataların 
kaynaklarının neler olabileceği, bu hataların ortaya çıkarılma metodları, günümüze 
kadar olan zaman içerisinde konu ile ilgili yapılan araştırmaların neler olduğu ve ne 
gibi sonuçların çıkarıldığı, ileri tarihlerde hangi uygulamalarla havaaracı bakım 
işletmelerinin insan faktöründen kaynaklanan hatalardan korunabileceği 
hususlarında çalışmalar araştırılmış ve bir örnek üzerinde Six Sigma yaklaşımı 
yapılarak analiz yapılmıştır. Ayrıca bazı organizasyonlarda uygulanan İnsan 
Faktörleri programlarının istatisksel verilerle analizleri yapılmak sureti ile nasıl 
gerçekçi çözümler oluşrulabileceği, ve bu çözümlerin uygulanmasının nasıl 
olabileceği üzerinde çalışma yapılmıştır. 
Uçak bakımı küresel havacılık sektöründe çok önemli bir süreçtir. Hava trafiği 
arttıkça ve uçakların uçuş sayılarına bağlı olarak ticari anlamda gelişmeler 
sağlandıkça, hava aracı bakım sürecinde oluşabilecek baskı artış gösterebilecektir. 
Bu durum insan faktörü konusunda yeni penceler açılmasına fırsatlar 
çıkarabilecektir. Bu durumların karşılaştırılmasındaki en önemli etkenlerden biri olan 
araştırmalar bu süreçlerde bizlere yardımcı olabilecektir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Altı sigma, bakım, hata, havacılık, hava aracı, insan faktörü 
Bilim Dalı Sayısal Kodu: 618.01.05 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
Aircraft maintenance is an essential component of the aviation system which 
supports the global aviation industry. As air traffic grows and the stringent 
requirements of commercial schedules impose increased demands upon aircraft 
utilization, the pressures on maintenance operations for on-time performance will 
also continue to escalate. This will open further windows of opportunity for human 
error and subsequent breakdowns in the system's safety net. It is also beyond 
question that unless the aviation industry learns from these occurrences, 
maintenance-related safety breakdowns will continue to occur. From a Human 
Factors perspective, important truths have been uncovered during the investigation 
of these occurrences [17]. 
In this research project we will analyze the top human factor problems in aviation 
maintenance and evaluate a solution to addressing these problems. We will start 
with the background and description of the subject and a brief look at the history of 
HF programs and the changes that have taken place over the years in aviation. We 
will also look at the statistics of human errors in aircraft maintenance and explore 
the current HF programs adopted by several organizations and try to understand 
why HF error occur, and how comprehensive, the solutions currently adopted. Then 
finally, we will look at a company named as ABC’s quality program and criteria for 
the human related errors in aircraft maintenance to see if we can formulate a more 
comprehensive solution to managing HF in maintenance. In essence, we would be 
looking at a more systemic solution to HF management as HF is more than just 
about people. 
1.1  Background of the problem 
There is no question that human error in aircraft maintenance and inspection has 
been a causal factor in several recent air carrier accidents. Whenever humans are 
involved in an activity, human error is a certain sequel. 
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According to one source [9] the number of maintenance concern accidents and 
incidents to public transport aircraft has increased significantly. This source defines 
maintenance concern as one which is not necessarily a maintenance error (it may 
be a design error) but one which is of concern to the maintenance personnel as 
frontline managers of technical problems in daily operations. The same source 
states that in the first half of the 1980s, there were 17 maintenance concern-related 
accidents and incidents, involving aircraft belonging only to Western operators and 
excluding all “routine” technical failures (engine, landing gear, systems, structure, 
component separations, ramp accidents, etc). All these accidents and incidents had 
serious consequences (fatal, serious damage, significant previous occurrences, 
significant airworthiness implications, etc). In the second half of the 1980s, the same 
source enumerates 28 accidents of maintenance concern, an increase of 65% over 
the first half of the decade. In the same period, traffic movements (flight departures, 
scheduled and non-scheduled) increased by 22%. In the first three years of the 
1990s there were 25 accidents involving maintenance concerns. This compares with 
seven in the first three years of the 1980s [17]. 
Whether maintenance concern-related occurrences are a “new” phenomenon in 
aviation or whether they have always existed but have only recently been validated 
by statistics may be a matter of debate. Indeed, the awareness of the importance of 
maintenance to aviation safety may be the logical consequence of the gradual 
acceptance of broader, systemic approaches to aviation safety. Whatever the case 
may be, the increase in the rate of accidents and incidents involving maintenance 
concerns appears to be at least statistically significant. In the last ten years, the 
annual average has increased by more than 100% while the number of flights has 
increased by less than 55%. 
Aircraft have become more automated and more complex. The current generation of 
Boeing 747-400s and Airbus A340s has duplicated or triplicated flight management 
systems. This may have reduced the burden on the flight crew but it has placed a 
greater demand on aircraft maintenance technicians, many of whom acquired their 
basic training in mechanical rather than computerized control systems. This 
suggests a mismatch of the Liveware- Hardware (L-H) and Liveware-Software (L-S) 
components of the SHEL model. This model will be explained in this thesis section 
2.10.4. 
The increasing significance of human error is not unique to aircraft engineering. 
Hollnagel [12] conducted a survey of the Human Factors literature to identify the 
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extent of the human error problem. In the 1960s, when the problem first began to 
attract serious attention, the estimated contribution of human error to accidents was 
around 20%. In the 1990s, this figure has increased fourfold to 80%. There are 
many possible reasons for this dramatic increase, but there are three which relate to 
aircraft engineering (Figure 1.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The role played by human performance in civil aircraft accidents [14] 
The reliability of mechanical and electronic components has increased markedly 
over the past thirty years. People have stayed the same. 
Increased aviation system complexity creates the potential for organizational 
accidents in which latent procedural and technical failures combine with operational 
personnel errors and violations to penetrate or circumvent defences as the Reason 
model suggests. In short, complexity acts to shift the errors to other people. 
Traditionally, Human Factors endeavors have been directed towards flight crew 
performance and, to a lesser extent, towards the performance of air traffic 
controllers. Until recently, available literature showed little consideration of the 
Human Factors issues which could affect aircraft maintenance personnel who 
inspect and repair aircraft. This has been a serious oversight, since it is quite clear 
that human error in aircraft maintenance has indeed had as dramatic an effect upon 
the safety of flight operation as the errors of pilots and air traffic controllers. 
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1903 TodayTIME
~80% of accidents are now 
due to human error
~20% of accidents are now 
due to machine causes
 4
Aircraft maintenance and inspection uty can be very complex and varied in an 
environment where possibilities for error is abound. Maintenance personnel — at 
least in the most developed aviation systems — frequently work under considerable 
time pressures. Personnel at the maintenance base and at the flight line stations 
realize the importance of meeting scheduled departure times. Operators have 
increased aircraft utilization in order to counteract the economic problems that 
plague the industry. Aircraft maintenance technicians are also maintaining a fleet 
that is increasing in age. It is not uncommon to find 20 to 25 year old aircraft in many 
airline fleets, including those of major operators. In addition, many operators intend 
to keep some of these aircraft in service in the foreseeable future, perhaps beyond 
the turn of the century [17]. Engine hush kits will make some older narrow-body 
aircraft economically and environmentally viable. However, these aircraft are 
maintenance-intensive. The old airframes require careful inspection for signs of 
fatigue, corrosion and general deterioration. This places an increased burden on the 
maintenance workforce. It creates stressful work situations, particularly for those 
engaged in inspection tasks, because additional maintenance is required and 
because the consequences may be serious if the signs of aging, which are 
frequently subtle, remain undetected. 
While maintenance of these aging aircraft is ongoing, new technology aircraft are 
entering the fleets of many of the world's airlines, thus increasing the demands on 
aircraft maintenance. These new aircraft embody advanced technology such as 
composite material structures, “glass cockpits”, highly automated systems and built-
in diagnostic and test equipment. The need to simultaneously maintain new and old 
fleets requires aircraft maintenance technicians to be more knowledgeable and 
adept in their work than they may have been previously. The task of simultaneously 
maintaining these diverse air carrier fleets will require a highly skilled workforce with 
proper educational background. 
There is at present a growing awareness of the importance of Human Factors 
issues in aircraft maintenance and inspection. The safety and effectiveness of airline 
operations are also becoming more directly related to the performance of the people 
who inspect and service the aircraft fleets. One of the objectives of this digest is to 
bring to light Human Factors issues which are of significant importance to aviation 
safety [17]. 
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1.2 Motivation 
The purpose of the work where this document states, to describe clearly and to 
evaluate how to control and eliminate the errors those have been caused by human 
during the maintenance of the aircraft. 
The human factor error data in aircraft maintenance that has been used in this 
document has been evaluated and compared statistically with the other error 
factors. The data collection has been done by reviewing the other documents those 
have been issued on this subject and evaluation of the incidents and accidents in 
one of the private aircraft maintenance company in Turkiye. 
I believe this document will be helpful for the aircraft maintenance companies in civil 
aviation in the world. 
1.3  Scope of the work 
Information about the six sigma methodolgy is provided in the third section of this 
thesis. In the Fourth section, findings recorded for four years between 2003 and 
2006 during internal and external audits in the database of the quality department of 
an industry approved aircraft maintenance facility, are evaluated. In this evaluation, 
using six sigma methodolgy, the problem is defined, its importance is determined, 
the sources for this problem are identified and how these sources can be deleted or 
be taken under control using statistical apporach, are studied. 
1.4  Description of the thesis 
China Eastern flight 5210 (CES5210, MU5210) was a flight from Baotou, Inner 
Mongolia, China to Shanghai Hongqiao Airport Shanghai, China. On November 21, 
2004 it crashed into a park shortly after take off, killing all 53 passengers on board 
and two more people on the ground. 
The aircraft took off at 08.20'/8.20am local time (00.20/12.20am UTC/19.20/7.20pm 
ET). In less than a minute, it was out of control and crashed into a lake inside 
Nanhai Park, two kilometres from the airport. Eye witnesses reported seeing smoke 
near the plane shortly after take off, followed by shaking of the plane and then its 
eventual crash. The CVR recording contains the captain calling "What's wrong?" 
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and passengers crying at the time of the crash. The aircraft departed 15 minutes 
ahead of schedule. 
Aircraft 
Model: Bombardier CRJ-200LR  
Registration: B-3072  
Serial Number: 7697  
Engine: General Electric CF34-3B1 
Year of Delivery: 2002 
Weather 
Weather at the time of crash was fine, although the temperature was below zero 
degrees Celsius. There was a rumor stating that the fuel was "frozen", causing the 
disaster. This was immediately proved to be impossible. 
Accident report 
On May 26, 2005, at the Flight Safety Conference of China Eastern Region, Yang 
Yuanyuan, president of CAAC declared the disaster was caused by human error: 
The crew did not perform the de-icing procedure and the preflight inspection, the 
snow and ice on the control surface and fuselage seriously degraded the lift, which 
caused the immediate crash after becoming airborne. 
According to the airport security log, the crew arrived at the airport late at 08:00CST, 
just 20 minutes before the scheduled departure time, which was insufficient for a 
complete preflight inspection. Normally the crew should arrive at least 90 minutes 
before departure. The report has yet to be formally released to the public [28]. 
The above accident can give us an idea what this thesis is related with. This thesis 
shows that human factors in aircraft maintenance are a very critical element to 
consider in reducing maintenance errors. What is shown here is that the old school 
approach of “fire the technician who did the error” is not the right way to resolve the 
problem? The more effective way is to evaluate the reasons, namely the “why”s of 
that human factor in the error and reduce or eliminate the reasons underlying such 
that this error or similar errors will not occur whoever the person conducting the 
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maintenance action is. To do this, a systematic approach works the best, also to 
reduce the variation in analyzing the problem from case to case. For this reason, it is 
shown that six sigma methodoly is not only effective for manufacturing environment 
problems but also very useful for human factor analysis in aircraft maintenance. 
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2  HUMAN FACTORS IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 
2.1  Human Factors 
The term “human factors” is used in many different ways in the aviation industry. 
The term is, perhaps, best known in the context of aircraft cockpit design and Crew 
Resource Management (CRM). However, those activities constitute only a small 
percentage of aviation-related human factors, as broadly speaking it concerns any 
consideration of human involvement in aviation [18]. 
The use of the term “human factors” in the context of aviation maintenance is 
relatively new. Aircraft accidents such as that to the Aloha aircraft in the USA in 
1988 and the BAC 1-11 windscreen accident in the UK in June 1990 brought the 
need to address human factors issues in this environment into sharp focus. This 
does not imply that human factors issues were not present before these dates nor 
that human error did not contribute to other incidents; merely that it took an accident 
to draw attention to human factors problems and potential solutions. 
"Human factors" refers to the study of human capabilities and limitations in the 
workplace. Human factors researchers study system performance. That is, they 
study the interaction of maintenance personnel, the equipment they use, the written 
and verbal procedures and rules they follow, and the environmental conditions of 
any system. The aim of human factors is to optimise the relationship between 
maintenance personnel and systems with a view to improving safety, efficiency and 
“well-being”. 
Before discussing how these accidents were related to human factors, a definition of 
human factors is required. There are many definitions available. Some authors refer 
to the subject as ‘human factors’ and some as ‘ergonomics’. Some see “human 
factors” as a scientific discipline and others regard it as a more general part of the 
human contribution to system safety. 
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The description of “Human Factors” has been documented in many ways by 
different agencies within a same manner. The followings are the different definitions 
of this subject: 
By Elwyn Edwards [19]: Human Factors is concerned to optimize the relationship 
between people and their activities, by the systematic application of human 
sciences, integrated within the framework of systems engineering. 
By UK CAA [20]: Human Factors as a term has to be clearly defined because when 
these words are used in the vernacular they are often applied to any factor related to 
human. The human element is the most flexible, adaptable and valuable part of the 
aviation system, but it is also the most vulnerable to influences which can adversely 
affect its performance. Throughout the years, some three out of four accidents have 
resulted from less than optimum human performance. This has commonly been 
classified as human error. The term “human error” can be misleading when referring 
to human factors in accident prevention, because although it may indicate WHERE 
in the system a breakdown occurs, it provides no guidance as to WHY it occurs. An 
error attributed to humans in the system may have been design-induced or 
stimulated by inadequate training, badly designed procedures or the poor concept or 
layout of manuals. Further, the term “human error” allows concealment of the 
underlying factors which must be brought to the fore if accidents are to be 
prevented. In fact, contemporary safetythinking argues that human error should be 
the starting point rather than the stop-rule in accident investigation and prevention. 
An understanding of the predictable human capabilities and limitations and the 
application of this understanding are the primary concerns of Human Factors. 
Human Factors has been progressively developed, refined and institutionalised for 
many decades, and is now backed by a vast store of knowledge which can be used 
by those concerned with enhancing the safety of the complex system which is 
today’s civil aviation. 
By FAA [21]: Within the FAA, human factors entails a multidisciplinary effort to 
generate and compile information about human capabilities and limitations and 
apply that information to equipment, systems, facilities, procedures, jobs, 
environments, training, staffing, and personnel management for safe, comfortable, 
and effective human performance. 
By FAA [22]: Human Factors refers to the study of human capabilities and limitations 
in the workplace. Human Factors include, but are not limited to, such attributes as 
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human physiology, psychology, work place design, environmental conditions, 
humanmachine interface, and more. Human Factors researchers study system 
performance. That is, they study the interaction of humans, the equipment they use, 
the written and verbal procedures and rules they follow, and the environmental 
conditions of any system. 
By dictionary [23]: "Human factors" is an umbrella term for several areas of research 
that include human performance, technology, design, and human-computer 
interaction. It is a profession that focuses on how people interact with products, 
tools, procedures, and any processes likely to be encountered in the modern world. 
By Jensen, R. [13]: “Human Factors” and ergonoics and engineering psychology are 
roughly equivalent terms used for the field of science concerned with the 
optimization of the relationship between people and the machines they operate 
through the systematic application of human sciences integrated within the 
framework of systems engineering. Human Factors has been more widely used in 
the USA, ergonomics has been more widely used outside of the USA, and 
engineering psychology has been more widely used in academia. 
By Sanders, M.S. and McCormick, J. [1]: Human Factors focuses on human beings 
and their interaction with products, equipment, facilities, procedures, and 
environments used in work and every-day living. The emphasis is on human beings 
(as opposed to engineering, where the emphasis is more on strictly technical 
engineering considerations) and how the design of things influences people. Human 
Factors, then, seeks to change the things people use and the environments in which 
they use these things to better match the capabilities, limitations, and needs of 
people. 
ICAO Definitions Relating to Human Factors 
Human Factors Principles: Principles which apply to aeronautical design, 
certification, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface 
between the human and other system components by proper consideration to 
human performance [24]. 
Human performance: Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on 
the safety and efficiency of aeronautical operations [24]. 
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Human Factors is about people: it is about people in their working and living 
environments and it is about their relationship with equipment, procedures and the 
environment. Just as importantly, it is about their relationships with other people. 
Human Factors involves the overall performance of human beings within the 
aviation system; it seeks to optimize people's performance through the systematic 
application of the human sciences, often integrated within the framework of system 
engineering. Its two objectives can be seen as safety and efficiency [25]. 
Human factors are essentially a multi-disciplinary field, including but not limited to: 
psychology, engineering, physiology, sociology and anthropometry [25]. 
Human Factors has come to be concerned with diverse elements of the aviation 
system. These include human behavior and performance; decision-making and 
other cognitive processes; the design of controls and displays; flight deck and cabin 
layout; communication and software aspects of computers; maps, charts and 
documentation; and the refinement of training. Each of these aspects demands 
skilled and effective human performance [25]. 
Aviation Human factors are primarily oriented towards solving practical problems in 
the real world. As a concept, its relationship to the human sciences might well be 
likened to that of engineering to the physical sciences. And, just as technology links 
the physical sciences to various engineering applications, there are a growing 
number of integrated Human Factors techniques or methods; these varied and 
developing techniques can be applied to problems as diverse as accident 
investigation and the optimization of pilot training [25]. 
Briefly human factors means; In information operations, the psychological, cultural, 
behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of 
information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any 
level in a state or organization. 
2.2    Errors, Violations and Non-compliance with Procedures 
As we may recall, maintenance and inspection errors are implicated in 12% of major 
air accidents. However, maintenance error costs not just lives, but money too. This 
is a short list of some of the major cost factors associates with maintenance error. 
1- The average cost of an inflight engine shutdown is $500,000. 
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2- The average cost of a flight cancellation is $50,000. 
3- The average cost of a return to gate is $15,000. 
4- The Airline Transportation estimates that ground damage costs $850 
million/year 
5- The average ground damage incident costs $70,000. 
6- One airline estimated between $75-$100 million/year is wasted on error. 
A Hangar example: 
The following example illustrates how a simple mistake made by an AMT affects an 
entire organization. A 747 was brought into the hangar for heavy maintenance. It 
was backed too far and collided with the aft work stands, causing the stands to fall 
through the rear wall of the hangar. Fortunately, no one was hurt. Take a second 
and consider how much this accident ended up costing the airline (See Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1 : The picture of the aircraft 
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As a result, all of the following equipment was damaged; 
1- Left-hand horizontal stabilizer 
2- Rudder 
3- Rear dock stands 
4- Hangar wall 
Here is a list of the cost factors associated with this one example; 
1- material 
2- regular and overtime labor 
3- repair to dock stands and hangar wall 
4- loss of bay during extra repair duration 
5- delayed or third party maintenance for other aircraft 
6- operational complications due to aircraft unavailability 
7- investigation and remediation 
Estimated total cost = $900,000!  
When we begin to consider the cost implications of this one maintenance error in 
terms of the entire organization, we will see that this one slip consumed ½ day’s 
total profit for the whole airline! Put another way, 60.000 airline personnel using 700 
aircraft and associated equipment can work for 8-12 hours merely to repay two 
serious maintenance errors. Obviously, the impact would be worse on a smaller 
airline. 
1-  Annual airline revenue = $ 12,000,000,000 
2- Revenue/day = $33,000,000 
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3- Estimated profit margin = 5% 
4- Profit per day = $1,650,000 
5- Total repair/associated costs = $900,000 
6- Summary : Error consumed ½ day of total profit 
Boeing analyzed the most common errors behind 746 inflight shutdowns. In all, 
almost 70% of inflight shutdowns were traced back to installation problems. 
1- Incomplete installation (48%) 
2- Damage on installation (14.5%) 
3- Improper installation (11%) 
4- Equipment not installed or missing (11%) 
5- Foreign object damage (6.5%) 
6- Improper troubleshooting, inspection and test (5%) 
7- Equipment not activated or deactivated (4%) 
Researchers studied the most frequently occurring maintenance problems. The top 
8 are listed in order of occurrence [16]. 
1- Incorrect installation of components 
2- The fitting of wrong parts 
3- Electrical wiring discrepancies (including cross-connection) 
4- Loose objects (tools, etc.) left in aircraft 
5- Inadequate lubrication 
6- Cowlings, access panels, and fairings not secured 
7- Landing gear and refuel not secured 
An other study performed by Pratt& Whitney (US Engine Manufacturer) of 120 
inflight shut downs revealed similar results. Problems with installation were, by far, 
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the most frequent made (120 IFSDs on 747s in 1991. Causes ranked by frequency 
– Pratt & Whitney) [16]; 
1- Missing parts 
2- Incorrect parts 
3- Worn out parts 
4- Careless installation of O-rings 
5- B-nuts not safely wired 
6- B-nuts wired backwards 
7- Nuts not torqued 
8- Over torquing 
9- Not loosening both ends of connection 
10- Replacing tube assembly without breaking connections 
A working definition of “human error” (including violations) is “those occasions in 
which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its 
intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention 
of some chance agency” [2]. 
We could have an idea about the portion of the Human Error in aircraft maintenance 
[3]. 
Human error rather than technical failures has the greatest potential to adversely 
affect contemporary aviation safety. The Boeing recently analyzed 220 documented 
accidents and found the top three causal factors to be: 
• Flight crews not adhering to procedures (70/220) 
• Maintenance and inspection errors (34/220) 
• Design defects (33/220) 
The following quotation illustrates this point: 
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“Because civil aircraft are designed to fly safely for unlimited time provided defects 
are detected and repaired, safety becomes a matter of detection and repair rather 
than one of aircraft structure failure. In an ideal system, all defects which could 
affect flight safety will have been predicted in advance, located positively before they 
become dangerous, and eliminated by effective repair. In one sense, then, we have 
changed the safety system from one of physical defects in aircraft into one of errors 
in complex human-centered systems.” [13]. 
 2.3  Aviation Safety Culture 
The safety culture is very important in aviation. This subject is a phrase like “Safety 
comes first”. 
“For the need of a nail the shoe was lost. 
For the need of a shoe the horse was lost. 
For the need of a horse the messenger was lost, 
For the need of a messenger the battle was lost. 
For the need of a battle the country was lost. 
And all for the need for care about a horseshoe nail.” as Benjamin Franklin said. 
The air safety has been defined in the dictionary [23] as: Air safety is a broad term 
encompassing the theory, investigation and categorization of flight failures, and the 
prevention of such failures through appropriate regulation, as well as through 
education and training. It can also be applied in the context of campaigns that inform 
the public as to the safety of air travel. No matter the speed and economy of any 
mode of transportation, if it is not perceived and demonstrated as safe, it will find 
few customers and, with few customers, unless it can still be priced to make a profit, 
the transportation mode will fail and fade from the scene. The dirigibles of the 1920s 
and '30s provide a good example of this principle. 
An organization with a good safety culture is one which has managed to 
successfully institutionalize safety as a fundamental value of the organization, with 
personnel at every level in the organization sharing a commitment to safety [20]. 
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One of the key elements is effective support from the top levels of the organization, 
for safety. It is necessary for senior management to demonstrate their commitment 
to safety in practical terms, not just verbally or only as long as safety is a no-cost 
item. 
It is all very well for an organization to commit to putting in place, say, a safety 
reporting and investigation scheme but if such a scheme is not resourced properly 
or if safety recommendations are not acted upon, it will be ineffective. It is also 
important that such commitment to safety is long-term, and that safety initiatives are 
not the first items to be cut in terms of financial support when the organization is 
looking for cost savings. Safety management within an organization should be 
addressed with as much commitment as financial management tends to be. CAP 
712 [29] describes the elements of a Safety Management System which should, if 
implemented properly and supported, lead to a good safety culture. 
Table 2.1 : Key Elements Contributing Towards a Good Safety Culture [16] 
 
 
 
 
 
The Benefits of a Safety Management System are to improve on existing levels of 
aviation safety in the light of the continuing growth of the industry, additional 
measures are needed. One such measure is to encourage individual operators to 
introduce their own Safety Management System. Such a system is as important to 
business survival as a financial management system and the implementation of a 
Safety Management System should lead to achievement of one of civil aviation’s 
key business goals: enhanced safety performance aiming at best practice and 
moving beyond mere compliance with regulatory requirements. 
A good safety culture needs to be nurtured, and is not something which can be put 
in place overnight, or with a training course alone. It can be improved in the short 
term by putting staff through a training course dealing with the elements of safety 
• Support from the top management 
• A formal safety policy statement 
• Awareness of the safety policy statements and organization 
• Practical support to enable the workforce to do planning, resources, workable 
procedures, etc. 
• A just culture and open reporting 
• A learning culture and willingness to change when 
• Corporate and personal integrity in supporting potentially conflicting 
commercial demands 
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culture. However, the improvement will only be sustained if the types of behaviours 
conducive to safety are rewarded and poor safety behaviour is not condoned, or 
even punished (in the extreme cases). This relies on staff at all levels within the 
organisation, especially middle management and supervisory levels, 
(i) Recognizing what good and bad safety behavior is, 
(ii) Good safety behavior being encouraged and poor safety behavior being 
discouraged. Sometimes the opposite is true in that staff are rewarded 
for cutting corners in order to meet commercial deadlines and, in a few 
cases, punished for complying with procedures (e.g. refusing to sign off 
work which they have not had the opportunity to check) [26]. 
(iii) A good safety culture is based on what actually goes on within an 
organisation on a day-to-day basis, and not on rhetoric or superficial, 
short term safety initiatives. 
It is possible to measure the safety culture of the organisation by using a safety 
culture survey. Care should be taken with the timing of such a survey, in that it may 
be positively or negatively affected by specific recent events such as industrial 
action, training courses, etc. It is important to be sure that measuring behaviour, 
attitudes and fundamental beliefs, rather than morale [16]. 
2.4  Maintenance Organization Safety Policy 
A certified (in accordance with the JAA regulations) maintenance company should 
establish a safety policy. This should be part of the Maintenance Organisation 
Exposition (MOE), and signed by the Accountable Manager. The safety policy 
should define the senior management’s intentions in terms of commitment to 
ensuring that aircraft are returned to service after maintenance in a safe condition 
[27]. 
An example of safety policy can be as following; 
The Quality and Safety Policy of ABC TECHNIC is always to keep quantity of 
customers` aircraft and aircraft components which are ready to release to service in 
maximum level by complying with the DGCA requirements and by taking into 
account safety and quality standards as : 
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- Recognize safety as a prime consideration at all times 
- Apply Human factors principles 
- Encourage personnel to report maintenance related errors/incidents 
- Recognize that compliance with procedures, quality standards, safety 
standards and regulations is the  duty of all  personnel 
- Recognize the need for all personnel to cooperate with the Quality 
Auditors 
2.5  What is the meaning of Aircraft Maintenance and recordings? 
In the nature of things, nothing man-made is indestructible, but performing repairs at 
intervals by an activity known as maintenance can extend useful life. Maintenance 
can be defined as those activities required to keep a facility in “as-built” condition 
and therefore continuing to have its original productive capacity [8]. 
Maintenance is usually categorized into the following three types [8]: 
(1) preventive maintenance – all actions carried out on a planned, periodic, and 
specific schedule to keep an item/equipment in stated working condition through the 
process of checking and reconditioning; 
(2) corrective maintenance – unscheduled maintenance or repair to return 
items/equipment to a defined state, carried out because maintenance persons or 
users perceived deficiencies or failures; and 
(3) predictive maintenance – the use of modern measurement and signal-processing 
methods to accurately diagnose items/equipment condition during operation. 
Aircraft maintenance checks [23] are periodic checks that have to be done on all 
aircraft after a certain amount of time or usage. Airlines casually refer to these 
checks as one of the following: A check, B check, C check, or D check. A and B 
checks are lighter checks, while C and D are considered heavier checks. 
A Check - This is performed approximately every month. This check is usually done 
overnight at an airport gate. The actual occurrence of this check varies by aircraft 
type, the cycle count (takeoff and landing is considered an aircraft "cycle"), or the 
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number of hours flown since the last check. The occurrence can be delayed by the 
airline if certain predetermined conditions are met. 
B Check - This is performed approximately every 3 months. This check is also 
usually done overnight at an airport gate. A similar occurrence schedule applies to 
the B check as to the A check. 
C Check - This is performed approximately every 12-18 months. This maintenance 
check puts the aircraft out of service and requires plenty of space - usually at a 
hangar at a maintenance base. The schedule of occurrence has many factors and 
components as has been described, and thus varies by aircraft category and type. 
D Check - This is the heaviest check for the airplane. This check occurs 
approximately every 4-5 years. This is the check that, more or less, takes the entire 
airplane apart for inspection. This requires even more space and time than all other 
checks, and must be performed at a maintenance base. 
Company produced task cards are based on procedures taken from related 
manufacturer manuals or written instructions such as telexes, faxes from 
manufacturer and the DGCA/EASA/FAA instructions. They are issued for periodic 
and scheduled maintenance. All task cards including repair details are certified by 
appropriately qualified personnel and covered in the work package which is cross 
referred to the certificate of release to service to be issued after scheduled 
maintenance. 
Aircraft Log Book 
The Aircraft Log System is a system for recording defects and malfunctions 
discovered during customer aircraft operation, details of all maintenance carried out 
on the particular aircraft while it is operating between scheduled visits to the Main 
Maintenance Base. It also contains information for each flight as Journey Log. It is 
used for recording operating information relevant to flight, flight safety and contains 
maintenance data that the operating crew needs to know. 
Description of Log System  
According to JAR OPS 1 Subpart M customer aircraft technical log may consist of 
two main reports as Aircraft Flight and Maintenance Report (AFMR) and Cabin 
Defect Report (CDR). It may also cover deferred items list as Hold Item List (HIL), 
Non-performance Acceptable Deferred Defects (ADD), and Cabin Acceptable 
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Deferred Defects. The customer may use equivalent forms, but the content of the 
forms must comply with JAR OPS 1 Subpart M. AFMR or equivalent customer form 
contain following information for each flight according to JAR OPS 1 Subpart M: 
- Aircraft type and registration 
- Date 
- Crew members name including duty assignment 
- Place of departure in three letters code 
- Place of arrival in three letters code 
- Time of departure (off-block time) 
- Time of arrival (off-block time) 
- Hours of flight 
- Number of landings 
- Delay time and reasons in codes -if any 
- Passenger data 
- Incident and observation -if any. 
- Reference loading for load sheet 
- Information for the quantity of fuel available at the beginning and at the end 
of the flight, and quantities of fuel and oil added before departure, 
- Provision for Certifying Staff and Pilot in Command to sign for Transit and  
Daily Check performance and acceptance respectively, 
- Provision for a Certificate of Release to Service following a scheduled  
maintenance check.  
- Details of any defect to the Aircraft Airworthiness and Flight Safety  
including emergency systems by flight crew or maintenance crew  
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- Details of work performed including component changes. 
- Provision for a Certificate of Release to Service following rectification of a  
defect 
- Cross reference to HIL 
 
Minimum Equipment List (MEL) Application 
The MEL is intended to permit operation with inoperative items of equipment for a 
period of time until repairs can be accomplished. The aircraft operator (airline) must 
establish and provide to the maintenance company a Minimum Equipment List for 
each type of Aircraft within its fleet, approved by the National Authority, based on, 
but not less restrictive than the relevant MMEL (Master Minimum Equipment List). 
The maintenance company does not operate an Aircraft other than in accordance 
with the approved MEL unless permitted by the National Authority. Any such 
permission does not permit operation outside the constraints of the MMEL. 
When an item is discovered to be inoperative, it is reported by making an entry in 
the customer technical log according to the related customer procedure. It is then 
repaired or may be deferred per the MEL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 :  Basic task description schemes 
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Figure 2.2 shows an example of the basic task description scheme in a Maintenance 
Repair Organization. 
2.6  Human Factors in Aviation History 
2.6.1  History of human factors 
In the late 1970s, Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) featured prominently in 
pilot training. The term was used to apply to the process of training flight crews to  
reduce pilot error by making better use of the resources on the flight deck. A change 
in name was made from Cockpit to Crew Resource Management (CRM) to change 
the emphasis of training to focus on cockpit group dynamics. Some airline programs 
dealt with specific topics such as team building, briefing strategies, situational 
awareness and stress management [4]. In the early 1990s, CRM training began to 
reflect the many factors, such as organizational culture, within the aviation system in 
which the crew must function which can determine safety. Similarly, but much later, 
it was not until in the 90s that Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) was 
made available to maintenance personnel. After years of accidents, many caused by 
HF errors, nothing significant was really done to determine the HF root causes. 
Unlike CRM, MRM was very new to the aviation maintainers and it was not until 
June 10, 1990 when a cockpit window blew out at 16,000 feet, and a pilot almost 
went with it, that an in depth look at the contributing factors to a maintenance error 
were examined. David King, from the United Kingdom is one of the first to look at HF 
in the same light it is looked at today [5]. 
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Figure 2.3 : Human Factors History [8]. 
The need for a change in approach to human errors and their reporting was 
reinforced during the CAA sponsored 12th Symposium on Human Factors in 
Aviation Maintenance that was held in Gatwick Airport, England, on 10-12 March 
1998. It was the first of the international symposiums involving the CAA, FAA and 
Transport Canada. The foundation of Human Factors training as a modern aviation 
tool was probably initiated in the United States at a workshop sponsored by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1979. This workshop was 
the development of NASA research into the causes of air transport accidents. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization, (ICAO) now requires organizations to 
include HFIM training. HF training which helps our fellow maintenance personnel to 
avoid an error he/she never intends to make had finally arrived (See Figure 2.3 and 
Figure 2.4) [8]. 
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Figure 2.4 : History of human factors training 
2.6.2  Literature review 
A comprehensive review of the published literature during the period 1981-2003 is 
presented on Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5 : Presents a histogram of publications on human error in maintenance 
for the period 1981-2003 [8]. 
An aviation maintenance and inspection task is a complex undertaking in which 
individuals perform varied tasks in an environment with time pressures, minimal 
feedback, and sometimes difficult ambient conditions. These situational 
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characteristics, in combination with generic human erring tendencies, result in varied 
forms of errors [10]. 
Latorell and Prabhu (2000) reviewed current approaches to identifying, reporting, 
and managing human error in aviation maintenance and inspection. They focused 
on both reactive and proactive methods of error detection and intervention strategies 
for controlling human error in aviation maintenance. 
Graeber and Marx’s (1993) article was focused on aircraft safety, and showed that 
maintenance error has significant economic implications. 
Maintenance resource management (MRM) was the theme of Taylor’s (2000a) 
article. In this article, he discussed systems thinking and culture change as current 
subjects in aviation human factors. In another paper, Taylor (2000b) described the 
test of the effectiveness of the MRM/TOQ (Maintenance Resource 
Management/Technical Operation Questionnaire) for its intended purpose as an 
evaluative measure. 
Allen and Rankin (1995) in their article discussed the Maintenance Error Decision 
Aid (MEDA) Tool and field test evaluation. 
In another article, Hibit and Marx (1994) anticipated that, by improving the analysis 
of individual events through tools such as MEDA, people can begin to better 
understand those factors underlying human error in maintenance so that future 
system performance can be methodically improved in better safety, greater 
maintenance system reliability, and economic efficiencies gained through error 
reduction. 
Nelson et al. (1998) presented structured methods of human error analysis 
developed and applied at Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
(INEEL) to identify potential human errors, assess their effect on system 
performance, and develop strategies to prevent the occurrences of errors or mitigate 
their consequences. Maintenance is considered an essential component of the air 
transportation system and an accident factor contributing to the loss of human lives. 
Masson and Koning (2001) in their publication tried to capture the philosophy and 
method behind JAR66 (Joint Aviation Requirements) and presented an overview of 
the error management concepts. 
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Kania (1997) conducted research into the causal factors that result in human error 
and additional maintenance paperwork. 
Ford (1997) discussed three different aspects of aerospace safety – accidents, 
regulation and human factors – in airline maintenance, and what is required to 
lessen the safety inadequacies in each of these two aspects. 
Manwaring et al.’s (1998) study showed that by adhering to existing regulations and 
manufacturer recommendations, and by implementing improved training and 
frequent maintenance, helicopter external load operations become safer. 
Shepherd (1997) presented a discussion of factors such as evaluation of simplified 
English, technician teaming and advanced technology, which influence the 
performance of inspectors and maintainers. 
Rankin et al. (2000) evaluated the development and implementation of an airline 
industry process (MEDA) for determining the factors that contribute to maintenance 
errors and making corrective actions to eliminate the occurrence of similar errors in 
future. 
Fotos (1991) in his paper presented a cockpit resource management (CRM) 
technique that is widely used by major US airlines to encourage teamwork and 
effective problem solving by maintenance personnel or pilots. 
Manwaring et al. (1998) presented a descriptive analysis of National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) “accident briefs” indicating that mechanical failure, pilot error, 
and maintenance errors are the most common probable causes of accidents. 
Koli et al. (1998) discussed two human factor audits – inspection audit and 
maintenance audit – which can provide aircraft maintenance and inspection 
personnel with rapid means of locating the human-system mismatches that can lead 
to errors. 
McGrath (1999) discussed aviation maintenance management imperatives in the 
hope of enhancing the professionalism of the field personnel’s culture with regard to 
airworthiness and safety. 
Ivaturi et al. (1995) reviewed task analysis of aircraft inspection/maintenance 
operations, which is the first effort to examine team training and effort within the 
aircraft inspection/maintenance environment. 
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In Ciavarelli’s (1997) article, the purpose of his study was to develop, validate, and 
apply a questionnaire survey methodology for assessing the effectiveness of naval 
units in managing risks associated with flight operations. 
Allen and Marx (1999) discussed the leading causes of major aircraft accidents and 
maintenance error analysis with the MEDA tool. 
Bacchi et al. (1997) reviewed major systems used in the aviation maintenance field 
for accident analysis and safety assessment. 
Walter (2000) discussed major elements of a model that includes needs 
identification, outlining targeted jobs, writing and verifying training procedures, and 
evaluating and establishing a maintenance/audit plan. 
Hobbs and Williamson (1995) conducted research in cooperation with an air carrier 
in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of identifying the types of errors made by 
aircraft maintenance technicians. 
Endsley and Robertson (2000) presented recommendations for developing a 
training program to improve situation awareness in aircraft maintenance at the 
individual and team levels. 
Wenner and Drury (2000) developed a methodology that allows analysis of reports 
of human error. 
Reason (1997) argued that maintenance-related errors rather than fallibility on the 
flight deck constitute the largest single human factors problem facing modern aircraft 
systems. In another paper (Reason, 1997), he discussed safety culture and its 
important four elements: 
(1) reporting culture; 
(2) just culture; 
(3) flexible culture; and 
(4) learning culture. 
O’Connor and Bacchi (1997) described an error taxonomy with respect to providing 
a structured framework for identifying and classifying human error in maintenance 
and dispatch operations. 
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Reason (2000) discussed a cognitive engineering perspective on maintenance 
errors and an activity-oriented approach to identify the human performance problem 
in aviation. 
Wanders (1985), in his case study, described the difficulties experienced in 
connection with the production control system, its adaptation, and the related 
organizational changes at a major overhaul facility. 
Hobbs (1995) identified the types of errors made by aircraft maintenance 
technicians and the systemic or organisational failures that set the conditions for 
such errors. 
Shepherd and Johnson’s (1995) paper discussed some examples of research 
efforts that are currently promoting safety and efficiency in maintenance worldwide. 
Shepherd and Kraus (1997) presented recent efforts that have been made to 
develop pre-training job aids and training programs that address human factors 
issues. 
Shepherd (1991) described activities concerning aircraft maintenance and 
inspection human factors. 
Amalberti and Wioland (1997) discussed the complex relationship between errors 
and accidents and the systemic and organisational safety approach followed for 
large socio-technical systems. 
Havard (1995) presented British Airways’ current initiatives with respect to human 
factors. 
Nunn and Witts (1997) discussed how human factors impact aircraft maintenance in 
Air UK Engineering. 
Hobbs and Robertson (1995) discussed an aircraft maintenance workshop report 
and its objectives. 
O’Leary and Chappell (1996) discussed the aviation safety reporting system (ASRS) 
and its role in incident reporting. 
Marksteiner (1999) concluded that some current maintenance practices and 
philosophies might be causing more problems than they are preventing. 
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Braithwaite (1997) examined cultural issues and the reasons behind Australia’s 
apparently good record for airline safety. 
Strauch and Sandler’s (1984) article discussed the role of the aviation maintenance 
technician (AMT) in the safe operation of an aviation system. 
Drury (1991) presented a taxonomy and ways and means of controlling 
maintenance errors. 
2.7   The Industry Need for Human Factors 
2.7.1  Overview 
Admiral Donald Engen, the former Administrator of the United States Federal 
Aviation Administration has been quoted as saying (1986): ”We spent over fifty 
years on the hardware, which is now pretty reliable. Now it’s time to work with 
people”. This declaration somehow sets the foundation upon which the industry 
need for Human Factors can be assessed. Curiously enough, we retain a lawyer for 
advice about a legal problem, or hire an architect to build a house, or consult a 
physician when trying to establish the diagnosis of a medical problem, but when it 
comes to solving Human Factors problems, we have adopted an intuitive and in 
many cases perfunctory approach, even though many lives may depend on the 
outcome. A background of many years of industry experience or thousands of flying 
hours may have little or no significance when looking for the resolution of problems 
which only a thorough understanding of Human Factors can provide. 
This is of special significance because, as already mentioned, it has long been 
known that some three out of four accidents result from performance errors made by 
healthy and properly certificated individuals. The sources of some of these errors 
may be traced to poor equipment or procedure design or to inadequate training or 
operating instructions. But whatever the origin, the question of human performance 
capabilities and limitations and human behavior is central to the technology of 
Human Factors. The cost, both in human and financial terms, of less than optimum 
human performance has become so great that a makeshift or intuitive approach to 
Human Factors is no longer appropriate. Safety being the ultimate objective of all 
those involved in aviation, its logical follow up is to ensure a proper level of Human 
Factors knowledge throughout the industry. 
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2.7.2  Incidents/ Accidents Where Maintenance Error was a Factor 
The best way to illustrate the effect on safety of a lack of proper application of 
Human Factors is through the example of accidents. A few accidents in which 
aspects of Human Factors are relevant are described here as examples. 
There have been several high profile accidents and incidents which have involved 
maintenance human factors problems. The “www.hfskyway.faa.gov” website lists 24 
NTSB accident reports of accidents where maintenance human factors problems 
have been the cause or a major contributory factor. In the UK, there have been 
three major incidents, details of which can be found on the AAIB (Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch) web site (www.aaib.gov.uk). Several of the major incidents 
and accidents where maintenance Human Factors has been a significant factor are 
summarized below [20]: 
2.7.2.1  NTSB/AAR-84/04. Eastern Airlines, L-1011, N334EA, Miami, May  
                       1983 
During maintenance, technicians failed to fit O-ring seals on the master chip 
detector assemblies. This led to loss of oil and engine failure. The aircraft landed 
safely with one engine. Technicians had been used to receiving the master chip 
detectors with O-ring seals already fitted and informal procedures were in use 
regarding fitment of the chip detectors. This problem has occurred before, but no 
appropriate action had been carried out to prevent a re-occurrence. 
2.7.2.2 NTSB/AAR-89/03. Aloha Airlines, B737-200, N73711, Hawaii, April 1988 
The Aloha accident involved 18 feet of the upper cabin structure suddenly being 
ripped away, in flight, due to structural failure (See Figure 2.6). The Boeing737 
involved in this accident had been examined, as required by US regulations, by two 
of the engineering inspectors. One inspector had 22 years experience and the other, 
the chief inspector, had 33 years experience. Neither found any cracks in their 
inspection. Post-accident analysis determined there were over 240 cracks in the 
skin of this aircraft at the time of the inspection. The ensuing investigation identified 
many human-factors-related problems leading to the failed inspections. 
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Figure 2.6 : Aloha Accident Picture; just after the landing. 
Joseph T. Nall, Member (June 14, 1989), filed the following concurring/dissenting 
statement: 
“While I concur with most of the majority's findings, I disagree with the probable 
cause and certain conclusions. 
Industry's best engineers reviewed the carrier's records, knew of its high-cycle 
operations, and even inspected some of Aloha's 737 fleet. 
No one--not Boeing, Aloha nor the FAA principal maintenance inspectors--
recognized or predicted the critical nature of the multi-site cracking or that the 
aircraft hull was about to rupture.  If a "failure" occurred, it was a system failure.  
Could those who designed, inspected or maintained the aircraft, given their 
knowledge at the time of the accident, have reasonably foreseen this accident was 
about to happen?  I think not.  I would have preferred to cite simply "the presence of 
undetected disbonding and fatigue cracking" as the probable cause.  I agree with 
the majority that contributing to the failure to detect the hull defects were systems, 
programs or decisions of all the participants. 
But I emphasize these are simply contributing factors, not the probable cause of the 
accident. 
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The majority's probable cause is too narrow and I therefore cannot agree that 
Aloha's maintenance program was the probable cause of the accident. I would have 
supported the following probable cause: 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this 
accident was the presence of undetected disbonding and fatigue cracking which led 
to the failure of the fuselage lap joint at S-10L. 
Contributing to the accident were: the failure of Aloha Airlines management to 
supervise its maintenance force properly; the failure of the Federal Aviation 
Administration to assess the quality and effectiveness of the Aloha Airlines 
maintenance program; the failure of FAA Airworthiness Directive 87-21-08 to require 
inspection of all the lap joints as proposed by Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
53A1039; and the lack of a complete terminating action (neither generated by 
Boeing nor required by the FAA) after the discovery of difficulties in the early 
production B-737 cold bond lap joint. 
2.7.2.2 AAIB/AAR 1/92, British Airways BAC1-11, G-BJRT, Didcot, June     
1990 
In 1990, in the UK, a BAC1-11 was climbing through 17,300 feet on departure from 
Birmingham International Airport when the left windscreen, which had been replaced 
prior to flight, was blown out under the effects of cabin pressure when it overcame 
the retention of the securing bolts, 84 of which, out of a total of 90, were smaller 
than the specified diameter. The commander was sucked halfway out of the 
windscreen aperture and was restrained by cabin crew whilst the co-pilot flew the 
aircraft to a safe landing at Southampton Airport. 
The Shift Maintenance Manager (SMM), short-handed on a night shift, had decided 
to carry out the windscreen replacement himself. He consulted the Maintenance 
Manual (MM) and concluded that it was a straightforward job. He decided to replace 
the old bolts and, taking one of the bolts with him (a7D), he looked for replacements. 
The store man advised him that the job required 8Ds, but since there were not 
enough 8Ds, the SMM decided that 7Ds would do (since these had been in place 
previously). However, he used sight and touch to match the bolts and, erroneously, 
selected 8Cs instead, which were longer but thinner. He failed to notice that the 
countersink was lower than it should be, once the bolts were in position. He 
completed the job himself and signed it off, the procedures not requiring a pressure 
check or duplicated check. 
 34
There were several human factors issues contributing to this incident, including 
perceptual errors made by the SMM when identifying the replacement bolts, poor 
lighting in the stores area, failure to wear spectacles, circadian effects, working 
practices, and possible organizational and design factors. The full text of the 
investigation can be found in AAIB report 1/92 and in the AAIB website, and an in 
depth discussion of the human factors aspects of this accident can be found in the 
book “Beyond Aviation Human Factors” by Maurino et al. 
2.7.2.3 NTSB/AAR-92/04. Britt Airways, (d/b/a Continental Express),  
 EMB-120, N33701, Eagle Lake, September 1991 
The EMB-120 suffered in-flight structural break up and crashed with no survivors. 
The accident occurred because the attaching screws on the top of the left side 
leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer had been removed during maintenance, 
leaving the leading edge/de-ice boot assembly secured to the horizontal stabilizer by 
only the bottom attachment screws. 
The report of this accident is of particular interest to human factors because, 
although the wording of the accident report placed the blame upon the individual 
technician(s) who failed to refit the horizontal stabilizer de-ice boots correctly, there 
was a dissenting statement by John Lauber (then of the NTSB) which referred to 
corporate culture being partially to blame, in addition to the many contributory 
factors leading to the incorrect re-fitment. 
2.7.2.4 AAIB/ AAR 2/95, Excalibur Airways, A320-212, G-KMAM,  
 Gatwick, August 1993 
Another incident in August 1993 involved an Airbus 320 which, during its first flight 
after a flap change, exhibited an undemanded roll to the right after takeoff. The 
aircraft returned to Gatwick and landed safely. The investigation discovered that 
during maintenance, in order to replace the right outboard flap, the spoilers had 
been placed in maintenance mode and moved using an incomplete procedure; 
specifically the collars and flags were not fitted. The purpose of the collars and the 
way in which the spoilers functioned was not fully understood by the technicians. 
This misunderstanding was due, in part, to familiarity of the technicians with other 
aircraft (mainly 757) and contributed to a lack of adequate briefing on the status of 
the spoilers during the shift handover. The locked spoiler was not detected during 
standard pilot functional checks. 
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The full text of the investigation can be found in AAIB report 2/95) and a synopsis 
can be found in the AAIB website. 
2.7.2.6 NTSB/SIR-94/02. Northwest Airlines, B747, N637US, Narita, March 1994 
On March 1st, 1994, a B747 landed at Narita Airport, Japan, with the front of the 
No.1 engine touching the ground. A fire developed but was quickly extinguished and 
there were no casualties. During maintenance, the No.1 pylon aft diagonal brace 
primary retainer had been removed but not re-installed. The NTSB special 
investigation report findings included: 
a) “Maintenance and inspection personnel who worked on the airplane 
were not adequately trained and qualified to perform the required maintenance and 
inspection functions. Critical functions had been taught by on-the-job training and 
were not standardized or formalized in an initial or recurrent training program”. 
b) “The ‘OK to close’ inspection of the pylon area was hampered  
c) “The CITEXT used by [the airline] was inadequate”. 
d) “The work environment for the heavy maintenance of the airplane 
was inadequate and contributed to an error-producing situation for the workers”. 
2.7.2.7 AAIB/ AAR 3/96, British Midland, B737-400, G-OBMM, Daventry,  
  February 1995 
In February1995, a Boeing 737-400 suffered a loss of oil pressure on both engines. 
The aircraft diverted and landed safely at Luton Airport. The investigation discovered 
that the aircraft had been subject to borescope inspections on both engines during 
the preceding night and the high pressure (HP) rotor drive covers had not been 
refitted, resulting in the loss of almost all the oil from both engines during flight. 
The line engineer was originally going to carry out the task, but, for various reasons, 
he swapped jobs with the base maintenance controller. The base maintenance 
controller did not have the appropriate paperwork with him. The base maintenance 
controller and a fitter carried out the task, despite many interruptions, but failed to 
refit the rotor drive covers. No ground idle engine runs (which would have revealed 
the oil leak) were carried out. The job was signed off as complete. 
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The full text of the investigation can be found in AAIB report 3/96 and in the AAIB 
website [15]. A detailed discussion of the incident can be found in Professor James 
Reason’s book “Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents”. 
2.7.2.8 AAIB Bulletin 5/97, British Airways, B747, GBDXK, Gatwick,  
  November 1996  
The 4L door handle moved to the ‘open’ position during the climb. The Captain 
elected to jettison fuel and return to Gatwick. An investigation revealed that the door 
torque tube had been incorrectly drilled/fitted. The Maintenance Manual required a 
drill jig to be used when fitting the new undrilled torque tube, but no jig was 
available. The LAE and Flight Technical Liaison Engineer (FTLE) elected to drill the 
tube in the workshop without a jig, due to time constraints and the operational 
requirement for the aircraft. The problem with the door arose as a result of 
incorrectly positioned drill holes. 
2.7.2.9  AIB Bulletin 7/2000. Airbus A320; G-VCED; 20/1/2000 
As the A320 rotated for take-off, both fan cowl doors detatched from the No 1 
engine and struck the aircraft. It is likely that the doors had been closed following 
maintenance but not latched. There are no conspicuous cues to indicate an 
unlatched condition, and no flight deck indication. Similar incident have occurred on 
at least 7 other occasions. 
2.7.2.10 Lufthansa A320 incident, 20 March 2001 
During maintenance, two pairs of pins inside one of the elevator/aileron computers 
were cross connected. This changed the polarity of the Captain’s side stick and the 
respective control channels, bypassing the control unit which might have sensed the 
error and would have triggered a warning. Functional checks post maintenance 
failed to detect the crossed connection because the technician used the first officer’s 
side stick, not the pilot’s. The pilots’ pre-flight checks also failed to detect the fault. 
The problem became evident after take-off when the aircraft ended up in a 21° left 
bank and came very close to the ground, until the co-pilot switched his sidestick to 
priority and recovered the aircraft. 
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2.8   Human Factor Errors in Aircraft Maintenance Statistics [8] 
It is only since Second World War that there have been profound advances in 
engineering and scientific technology that have highlighted the need for more 
attention to be paid to maintenance of engineering systems. Each year over $300 
billion is spent on plant maintenance and operation by US industry, and about 80 
percent of this is spent to correct the chronic failures of machines, systems, and 
people. 
Humans play an important role during the design, installation, production, and 
maintenance phases of a product. Human error may be defined as the failure to 
perform a specified task (or the performance of a forbidden action) that could lead to 
disruption of scheduled operations or result in damage to property and equipment. 
While human error has existed since the beginning of mankind, only in the last 50 
years has it been the subject of scientific inquiry. There are various reasons for the 
occurrence of human errors, including inadequate lighting in the work area, 
inadequate training or skill of the manpower involved, poor equipment design, high 
noise levels, an inadequate work layout, improper tools, and poorly written 
equipment maintenance and operating procedures. Human error may be classified 
into six categories: 
1. operating errors; 
2. assembly errors; 
3. design errors; 
4. inspection errors; 
5 installation errors; and 
6 maintenance errors [8]. 
Maintenance error occurs due to incorrect repair or preventive actions. Two typical  
examples are the incorrect calibration of equipment and application of the wrong 
grease at appropriate points of the equipment. The occurrence of maintenance 
errors increases due to the increase in maintenance frequency as the equipment 
becomes older [8]. 
A. J. Xavier performed a study on this subject as following [8];  
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In the United Kingdom (UK) between 1982 and 1991, there were 1,270 Mandatory 
Occurrence Reports (MOR) which involved maintenance errors submitted to the 
CAA Safety Data Department (CAA, 1992). Of these, only 230 resulted in an 
unexpected or undesirable occurrence that interrupts normal operating procedures 
that may cause an accident or incident. The CAA concluded that there was no 
significant risk to the public. 
In the period 1992-1994, however, there were 230 MORs and in 1995 to 1996 there 
were 534. The number of reported errors was occurring at a greater frequency. 
Similarly a study by Boeing in 1993 of 122 occurrences between 1989 and 1991 
revealed that 56% of human factors errors resulted in omissions with a further 30% 
resulting in incorrect installations. 
In a field test by Boeing in 1994 to 1995 with nine maintenance organizations, the 
main types, causes and results of errors are summarized on Table 2.2 (Boeing, 
1996). 
Table 2.2 : Boeing field test with MEDA 
1.  2.  3.  
Operational Events  
Maintenance Error 
Types  
Contributing Factors  
3 Top Items : 
Flight Delay Improper Installation Information 
(30%) (35%) (50%) 
Aircraft Damage 
(23%) 
Improper testing Communication 
 (15%) (42%) 
Air Turn Back Improper servicing Job/Task/Environment 
(15%) (12%) (40%) 
In 1998, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (Hobbs & Williamson, 1998) 
surveyed close to 1400 Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (LAMEs).  
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The most common outcomes for airline related maintenance occurrences were: 
1. Systems operated unsafely during maintenance 
2. Towing events 
3. Incomplete installation 
The most common outcomes of non-airline occurrences were: 
1. Incorrect assembly or orientation 
2. Incomplete installation 
3. Persons contacting hazards 
The most common causes to these unsafe acts are summarized on Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 : 1997 Survey by Australian Transportation Safety Bureau 
Occurrence Causes and Contributory 
factors  
Airline  Non-airline  
Pressure  21%  23%  
Fatigue  13%  14%  
Coordination  10%  11%  
Training  10%  16%  
Supervision  9%  10%  
Lack of Equipment  8%  3%  
Environment  5%  1%  
Poor Documentation  5%  4%  
Poor procedure  4%  4%  
A ground crew attitude survey in the military in Asia (classified source) revealed 
similar findings to that of the Australian Transport and Safety Board. The surveys 
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were conducted bi-annually from 1999 to 2003 on approximately 2500 aviation 
technicians. In the survey conducted in 1999, the top three violations were: 
1. Servicing without a checklist 
2. Speeding 
3. Omitting job steps 
Approximately 20% of those surveyed disclosed that they would violate rules daily 
or once a week. The top three reasons for these violations were: 
1. Too much work, too little time 
2. Insufficient manpower 
3. Time pressure to complete duties 
In 2003, when the survey was conducted again, several key initiatives had been 
implemented to address HFIM such as: 
1. Implementing a Human Factor training program initiated by Mr. 
Gordon Dupont, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), System Safety Services in 1999. 
2. Training 100% of the licensed aircraft engineers in Human Factors 
Management. 
3. Implementing a MEDA type Human Error Analysis Tool (HEAT). 
4. Embracing a local version of the Malcom Baldridge Performance 
Excellence Framework for the military over six years from 1998. 
5. Embracing additional performance excellence measurement tools 
such as the Balanced Score Card and Enhanced Value Organization principles. 
The survey results comparison between 1999 and 2003 revealed the following 
significant improvements as shown on Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 : Asian Study survey comparison between 1999 and 2003. 
Survey Coverage  Results  
Safety Culture 
(new)   
99% agreed that the organization placed strong 
emphasis on safety and quality. Personnel also 
agreed that management (96.43%), supervisors 
(97.30%) and personnel (94.38%) showed strong 
emphasis and take safety / quality seriously.  
Reasons for 
Violations  
 Top 4 reasons remain unchanged. “Easy way out 
(taking short cuts)”, which registered an increase of  
11% (13% to 24%), has emerged as the 5th 
reason.  "Lack of proper tools", the 6th reason, 
registered a significant increase of 14% (7% to 
21%).  
Types of Violations   Overall reduction of 4% (14% to 10%) was noted 
for the 6 common types of violations observed 
everyday and once a week.  
Frequency of 
Violations   
Improvement of 22% (21% to 43%) that violations 
observed were “very infrequent.”  
Calling Timeout   
Reduction by 11% (50% to 39%) in holding back to 
call timeout.  
Overtime 
Management   
Reduction by 11% (50% to 39%) in holding back to 
timeout. 
Open Reporting 
Culture   
Improvement of 16% (66% to 82%) that open 
reporting is being practiced widely in the 
organization. 
Safety / Quality 
Information 
Dissemination 
 98% (an improvement of 8%) agreed that 
Safety/Quality information are readily available. 
Management are also conducting briefings and 
dissemating safety/quality information more 
frequently, matching closely to that desired in the 
previous survey. 
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Several UK maintenance organizations have pooled their Maintenance Error 
Management System (MEMS) data, using a common MEDA taxonomy. The initial 
results were presented at a MEMS-MEDA seminar in the UK in May 2003, a 
selection of which is listed on Table 2.5 
Table 2.5 : Several UK Maintenance Error Management System (MEMS) data 
1.  2.  3.  
Improper Installation  Improper Fault Isolation  Improper Servicing  
3 Top Items :- 
Incomplete 
Installation  
System not 
Re/Deactivated  
Service not 
performed  
Wrong Orientation  Not properly tested  System not 
Re/Deactivated  
System not 
Re/Deactivated  
Not properly inspected  Insufficient fluid  
3 Top Factors :- 
Individual 
performance factors  
Individual performance 
factors  
Information  
Information  Information  Communications  
Technical 
knowledge/Skills  
Communications  Individual 
performance factors  
The maintenance error trends in US, Australia, Asia and United Kingdom from 1982 
to 2003 are alarmingly similar and they continue to plague the aviation industry and 
in some areas of aviation such as in the military. The trends in maintenance human 
factor errors have continued to increase. A closer look at the statistics indicates that 
these trends are due mainly to lapses in the organizational operational culture and 
business processes. 
Time pressure seems to be the main factor due to lack of manpower and excess 
workload. 
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In recent years, HF training has focused on these lapses in rules and the detrimental 
consequences of such actions. There is still an uptrend of these maintenance errors 
and violations in the aviation maintenance field. 
2.9   Human Performance and Limitations [18] 
Just as certain mechanical components used in aircraft maintenance engineering 
have limitations, engineers themselves have certain capabilities and limitations that 
must be considered when looking at the maintenance engineering ‘system’. For 
instance, rivets used to attach aluminum skin to a fuselage can withstand forces that 
act to pull them apart. It is clear that that these rivets will eventually fail if enough 
force is applied to them. While the precise range of human capabilities and 
limitations might not be as well-defined as the performance range of mechanical or 
electrical components, the same principles apply in that human performance is likely 
to degrade and eventually ‘fail’ under certain conditions (e.g. stress). 
Mechanical components in aircraft can, on occasion, suffer catastrophic failures. 
Man, can also fail to function properly in certain situations. Physically, humans 
become fatigued, are affected by the cold, can break bones in workplace accidents, 
etc. Mentally, humans can make errors, have limited perceptual powers, can exhibit 
poor judgement due to lack of skills and knowledge, etc. In addition, unlike 
mechanical components, human performance is also affected by social and 
emotional factors. Therefore failure by aircraft maintenance engineers can also be to 
the detriment of aircraft safety. 
The aircraft engineer is the central part of the aircraft maintenance system. It is 
therefore very useful to have an understanding of how various parts of his body and 
mental processes function and how performance limitations can influence his 
effectiveness at work. 
2.9.1  Vision Performance Issues 
Being able to see clearly is vital in aircraft maintenance and inspection. 
• Vision requirements are task based 
• Illumination requirements are task based 
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• Technicians must recognize their individual visual limitations and 
capabilities 
2.9.1.2  The Basic Function of the Eye 
In order to understand vision, it is useful first to know a little about the anatomy of 
the eye (see Figure 2.7). The basic structure of the eye is similar to a simple camera 
with an aperture (the iris), a lens, and a light sensitive surface (the retina). Light 
enters the eye through the cornea, then passes through the iris and the lens and 
falls on the retina. Here the light stimulates the light-sensitive cells on the retina 
(rods and cones) and these pass small electrical impulses by way of the optic 
nerve to the visual cortex in the brain. Here, the electrical impulses are interpreted 
and an image is perceived. 
 
Figure 2.7 : The human eye 
2.9.1.2  The Cornea 
The cornea is a clear ‘window’ at the very front of the eye. The cornea acts as a 
fixed focusing device. The focusing is achieved by the shape of the cornea bending 
the incoming light rays. The cornea is responsible for between 70% and 80% of the 
total focusing ability (refraction) of the eye. 
2.9.1.3  The Iris and Pupil 
The iris (the colored part of the eye) controls the amount of light that is allowed to 
enter the eye. It does this by varying the size of the pupil (the dark area in the center 
of the iris). The size of the pupil can be changed very rapidly to cater for changing 
light levels. The amount of light can be adjusted by a factor of 5:1. 
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2.9.1.4  The Lens 
After passing through the pupil, the light passes through the lens. Its shape is 
changed by the muscles (cillary muscles) surrounding it which results in the final 
focusing adjustment to place a sharp image onto the retina. The change of shape of 
the lens is called accommodation. In order to focus clearly on a near object, the lens 
is thickened. To focus on a distant point, the lens is flattened. The degree of 
accommodation can be affected by factors such as fatigue or the ageing process. 
When a person is tired accommodation is reduced, resulting in less sharp vision 
(sharpness of vision is known as visual acuity). 
2.9.1.5  The Retina 
The retina is located on the rear wall of the eyeball. It is made up of a complex layer 
of nerve cells connected to the optic nerve. Two types of light sensitive cells are 
found in the retina - rods and cones. The central area of the retina is known as the 
fovea and the receptors in this area are all cones. It is here that the visual image is 
typically focused. Moving outwards, the cones become less dense and are 
progressively replaced by rods, so that in the periphery of the retina, there are only 
rods. 
Cones function in good light and are capable of detecting fine detail and are color 
sensitive. This means the human eye can distinguish about 1000 different shades of 
color. Rods cannot detect color. They are poor at distinguishing fine detail, but good 
at detecting movement in the edge of the visual field (peripheral vision). They are 
much more sensitive at lower light levels. As light decreases, the sensing task is 
passed from the cones to the rods. This means in poor light levels we see only in 
black and white and shades of grey. 
2.9.1.6  Factors Affecting Clarity of Sight 
The eye is very sensitive in the right conditions (e.g. clear air, good light, etc.). In 
fact, the eye has approximately 1.2 million nerve cells leading from the retinas to the 
area of the brain responsible for vision, while there are only about 50,000 from the 
inner ears - making the eye about 24 times more sensitive than the ear. 
Before considering factors that can influence and limit the performance of the eye, it 
is necessary to describe visual acuity. 
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Visual acuity is the ability of the eye to discriminate sharp detail at varying distances. 
An individual with an acuity of 20/20 vision should be able to see at 20 feet that 
which the so-called ‘normal’ person is capable of seeing at this range. It may be 
expressed in metres as 6/6 vision. The figures 20/40 mean that the observer can 
read at 20 feet what a ‘normal’ person can read at 40 feet. 
Various factors can affect and limit the visual acuity of the eye. These include: 
• Physical factors such as: 
• physical imperfections in one or both eyes (short sightedness, long sightedness), 
• age. 
• The influence of ingested foreign substances such as: 
• drugs, 
• medication, 
• alcohol, 
• cigarettes. 
• Environmental factors such as: 
• amount of light available, 
• clarity of the air (e.g. dust, mist, rain, etc.). 
• Factors associated with object being viewed such as: 
• size and contours of the object, 
• contrast of the object with its surroundings, 
• relative motion of the object, 
• distance of the object from the viewer, 
• the angle of the object from the viewer. 
Each of these factors will now be examined in some detail. 
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2.9.1.7  Physical Factors 
Long sight - known as Hypermetropia - is caused by a shorter than normal eyeball 
which means that the image is formed behind the retina (Figure 2.8). If the cornea 
and the lens cannot use their combined focusing ability to compensate for this, 
blurred vision will result when looking at close objects. 
 
Figure 2.8 : A convex lenses will overcome long sightedness by bending light 
inwards before it reaches the cornea. 
Short sight - known as Myopia - is where the eyeball is longer than normal, causing 
the image to be formed in front of the retina (Figure 7). If the accommodation of the 
lens cannot counteract this then distant objects are blurred. 
2.9.1.8  Other visual problems include: 
• cataracts - clouding of the lens usually associated with ageing; 
• astigmatism - a misshapen cornea causing objects to appear irregularly shaped; 
• glaucoma - a build up in pressure of the fluid within the eye which can cause 
damage to the optic nerve and even blindness; 
• migraine - severe headaches that can cause visual disturbances. 
2.9.1.9  Finally  
As a person grows older, the lens becomes less flexible meaning that it is unable to 
accommodate sufficiently. This is known as presbyopia and is a form of long 
sightedness. Consequently, after the age of 40, spectacles may be required for near 
vision, especially in poor light conditions. Fatigue can also temporarily affect 
accommodation, causing blurred vision for close work. 
 
 
 48
2.9.1.10 Foreign Substances 
Vision can be adversely affected by the use of certain drugs and medications, 
alcohol, and smoking cigarettes. With smoking, carbon monoxide which builds up in 
the bloodstream allows less oxygen to be carried in the blood to the eyes. This is 
known as hypoxia and can impair rapidly the sensitivity of the rods. Alcohol can 
have similar effects, even hours after the last drink. 
2.9.1.11 Environmental Factors 
Vision can be improved by increasing the lighting level, but only up to a point, as the 
law of diminishing returns operates. Also, increased illumination could result in 
increased glare. Older people are more affected by the glare of reflected light than 
younger people. Moving from an extremely bright environment to a dimmer one has 
the effect of vision being severely reduced until the eyes get used to less light being 
available. This is because the eyes have become light adapted. If an engineer works 
in a very dark environment for a long time, his eyes gradually become dark adapted 
allowing better visual acuity. This can take about 7 minutes for the cones and 30 
minutes for the rods. As a consequence, moving between a bright hanger (or the 
inside of an aircraft) to a dark apron area at night can mean that the maintenance 
engineer must wait for his eyes to adjust (adapt). In low light conditions, it is easier 
to focus if you look slightly to one side of an object. This allows the image to fall 
outside the fovea and onto the part of the retina which has many rods. 
Any airborne particles such as dust, rain or mist can interfere with the transmission 
of light through the air, distorting what is seen. This can be even worse when 
spectacles are worn, as they are susceptible to getting dirty, wet, misted up or 
scratched. Engineers who wear contact lenses (especially hard or gas-permeable 
types) should take into account the advice from their optician associated with the 
maximum wear time - usually 8 to 12 hours - and consider the effects which 
extended wear may have on the eyes, such as drying out and irritation. This is 
particularly important if they are working in an environment which is excessively dry 
or dusty, as airborne particles may also affect contact lens wear. Goggles should be 
worn where necessary. 
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2.9.1.12 The Nature of the Object Being Viewed 
Many factors associated with the object being viewed can also influence vision. We 
use information from the objects we are looking at to help distinguish what we are 
seeing. These are known as visual cues. Visual cues often refer to the comparison 
of objects of known size to unknown objects. An example of this is that we associate 
small objects with being further away. Similarly, if an object does not stand out well 
from its background (i.e. it has poor contrast with its surroundings), it is harder to 
distinguish its edges and hence its shape. Movement and relative motion of an 
object, as well as distance and angle of the object from the viewer, can all increase 
visual demands. 
2.9.1.13  Color Vision 
Although not directly affecting visual acuity, inability to see particular colors can be a 
problem for the aircraft maintenance engineer. Amongst other things, good color 
vision for maintenance engineers is important for: 
• Recognizing components; 
• Distinguishing between wires; 
• Using various diagnostic tools; 
• Recognizing various lights on the airfield (e.g. warning lights). 
Color defective vision is usually hereditary, although may also occur as a temporary 
condition after a serious illness. 
Color-defective vision (normally referred to incorrectly as color blindness) affects 
about 8% of men but only 0.5% of women. The most common type is difficulty in 
distinguishing between red and green. More rarely, it is possible to confuse blues 
and yellows. 
There are degrees of color defective vision, some people suffering more than 
others. Individuals may be able to distinguish between red and green in a well-lit 
situation but not in low light conditions. Color defective people typically see the 
colors they have problems with as shades of neutral grey. 
Ageing also causes changes in color vision. This is a result of progressive yellowing 
of the lens, resulting in a reduction in color discrimination in the blue-yellow range. 
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Color defective vision and its implications can be a complex area and care should 
be taken not to stop an engineer from performing certain tasks merely because he 
suffers from some degree of color deficient vision. It may be that the type and 
degree of color deficiency is not relevant in their particular job. However, if 
absolutely accurate color discrimination is critical for a job, it is important that 
appropriate testing and screening be put in place. 
Vision and the Aircraft Maintenance Engineer 
It is important for an engineer, particularly one who is involved in inspection tasks, to 
have adequate vision to meet the task requirements. As discussed previously, age 
and problems developing in the eye itself can gradually affect vision. Without regular 
vision testing, aircraft maintenance engineers may not notice that their vision is 
deteriorating. 
In the UK, the CAA has produced guidance which states: 
“A reasonable standard of eyesight is needed for any aircraft engineer to perform his 
duties to an acceptable degree. Many maintenance tasks require a combination of 
both distance and near vision. In particular, such consideration must be made where 
there is a need for the close visual inspection of structures or work related to small 
or miniature components. The use of glasses or contact lenses to correct any vision 
problems is perfectly acceptable and indeed they must be worn as prescribed. 
Frequent checks should be made to ensure the continued adequacy of any glasses 
or contact lenses. In addition, color discrimination may be necessary for an 
individual to drive in areas where aircraft maneuver or where color coding is used, 
e.g. in aircraft wiring. 
Organizations should identify any specific eyesight requirement and put in place 
suitable procedures to address these issues.” 
Often, airline companies or airports will set the eyesight standards for reasons other 
than aircraft maintenance safety, e.g. for insurance purposes, or for driving on the 
airfield. 
Ultimately, what is important is for the individual to recognize when his vision is 
adversely affected, either temporarily or permanently and to consider carefully the 
possible consequences should they continue to work if the task requires good 
vision. 
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2.9.2   Hearing 
2.9.2.1  The Basic Function of the Ear 
The ear performs two quite different functions. It is used to detect sounds by 
receiving vibrations in the air, and secondly, it is responsible for balance and 
sensing acceleration. Of these two, the hearing aspect is more pertinent to the 
maintenance engineer, and thus it is necessary to have a basic appreciation of how 
the ear works. 
As can be seen on Figure 2.9, the ear has three divisions: outer ear, middle ear 
and inner ear. These act to receive vibrations from the air and turn these signals 
into nerve impulses that the brain can recognize as sounds. 
 
Figure 2.9 : The human ear 
2.9.2.2  Outer Ear 
The outer part of the ear directs sounds down the auditory canal, and on to the 
eardrum. The sound waves will cause the eardrum to vibrate. 
2.9.2.3  Middle Ear 
Beyond the eardrum is the middle ear which transmits vibrations from the eardrum 
by way of three small bones known as the ossicles, to the fluid of the inner ear. The 
middle ear also contains two muscles which help to protect the ear from sounds 
above 80 dB by means of the acoustic or aural reflex, reducing the noise level by 
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up to 20 dB. However, this protection can only be provided for a maximum of about 
15 minutes, and does not provide protection against sudden impulse noise such as 
gunfire. It does explain why a person is temporarily ‘deafened’ for a few seconds 
after a sudden loud noise. The middle ear is usually filled with air which is refreshed 
by way of the eustachian tube which connects this part of the ear with the back of 
the nose and mouth. However, this tube can allow mucus to travel to the middle ear 
which can build up, interfering with normal hearing. 
2.9.2.4  Inner Ear 
Unlike the middle ear, the inner ear is filled with fluid. The last of the ossicles in the 
middle ear is connected to the cochlea. This contains a fine membrane (the basilar 
membrane) covered in hair-like cells which are sensitive to movement in the fluid. 
Any vibrations they detect cause neural impulses to be transmitted to the brain via 
the auditory nerve. 
2.9.2.5  Performance and Limitations of the Ear 
The performance of the ear is associated with the range of sounds that can be 
heard - both in terms of the pitch (frequency) and the volume of the sound. 
Volume (or intensity) of sound is measured in decibels (dB). Table 2.6 shows 
intensity levels for various sounds and activities.  
Table 2.6 : Typical sound levels for various activities 
 
2.9.2.6  Impact of Noise on Performance 
Noise can have various negative effects in the workplace. It can:  
• be annoying (e.g. sudden sounds, constant loud sound, etc.); 
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• interfere with verbal communication between individuals in the workplace; 
• cause accidents by masking warning signals or messages; 
• be fatiguing and affect concentration, decision making, etc.; 
• damage workers’ hearing (either temporarily or permanently). 
The amount of vibration detected in the cochlea depends on the volume and pitch of 
the original sound. 
The audible frequency range that a young person can hear is typically between 20  
and 20,000 cycles per second (or Hertz), with greatest sensitivity at about 3000 Hz. 
Intermittent and sudden noise are generally considered to be more disruptive than 
continuous noise at the same level. In addition, high frequency noise generally has a 
more adverse affect on performance than lower frequency. Noise tends to increase 
errors and variability, rather than directly affect work rate. 
2.9.2.7  Hearing Impairment 
Hearing loss can result from exposure to even relatively short duration noise. The 
degree of impairment is influenced mainly by the intensity of the noise. Such 
damage is known as Noise Induced Hearing Loss (NIHL). The hearing loss can be 
temporary - lasting from a few seconds to a few days - or permanent. Temporary 
hearing loss may be caused by relatively short exposure to very loud sound, as the 
hair-like cells on the basilar membrane take time to ‘recover’. With additional 
exposure, the amount or recovery gradually decreases and hearing loss becomes 
permanent. Thus, regular exposure to high levels of noise over a long period may 
permanently damage the hairlike cells in the cochlea, leading to irreversible hearing 
impairment. 
The UK ‘Noise at Work’ regulations1 (1989) impose requirements upon employers. 
They stipulate three levels of noise at which an employer must act: 
a) 85 decibels (if normal speech cannot be heard clearly at 2 metres), employer 
must; 
• assess the risk to employees’ hearing, 
• tell the employees about the risks and what precautions are proposed, 
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• provide their employees with personal ear protectors and explain their use. 
b) 90 decibels (if normal speech cannot be heard clearly at 1 metre) employer must; 
• do all that is possible to reduce exposure to the noise by means other than  
by providing hearing protection, 
• mark zones where noise reaches the second level and provide recognized 
signs to restrict entry. 
c) 140 decibels (noise causes pain). 
The combination of duration and intensity of noise can be described as noise dose. 
Exposure to any sound over 80 dB constitutes a noise dose, and can be measured 
over the day as an 8 hour Time Weighted Average sound level (TWA). 
For example, a person subjected to 95 decibels for 3.5 hours, then 105 decibels for 
0.5 hours, then 85 decibels for 4 hours, results in a TWA of 93.5 which exceed the 
recommended maximum TWA of 90 decibels. 
Permanent hearing loss may occur if the TWA is above the recommended 
maximum. 
It is normally accepted that a TWA noise level exceeding 85 dB for 8 hours is 
hazardous and potentially damaging to the inner ear. Exposure to noise in excess of 
115 decibels without ear protection, even for a short duration, is not recommended. 
2.9.2.8  Hearing Protection 
Hearing protection is available, to a certain extent, by using ear plugs or ear 
defenders. 
It is good practice to reduce noise levels at source, or move noise away from 
workers. 
Often this is not a practical option in the aviation maintenance environment. Hearing 
protection should always be used for noise, of any duration, above 115 dB. 
Referring again to Table 1, this means that the aviation maintenance engineer will 
almost always need to use some form of hearing protection when in reasonably 
close proximity (about 200 - 300m) to aircraft whose engines are running. 
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2.9.2.9  Hearing and the Aircraft Maintenance Engineer 
The UK, CAA makes the following recommendations regarding hearing: 
“The ability to hear an average conversational voice in a quiet room at a distance of 
2 metres (6 feet) from the examiner is recommended as a routine test. Failure of this 
test would require an audiogram to be carried out to provide an objective 
assessment. If necessary, a hearing aid may be worn but consideration should be 
given to the practicalities of wearing the aid during routine tasks demanded of the 
individual.” 
It is very important that the aircraft maintenance engineer understands the limited 
ability of the ears to protect themselves from damage due to excessive noise. Even 
though engineers should be given appropriate hearing protection and trained in its 
use, it is up to individuals to ensure that they actually put this to good use. It is a 
misconception that the ears get used to constant noise: if this noise is too loud, it will 
damage the ears gradually and insidiously. 
2.9.3  Information Processing 
The previous sections have described the basic functions and limitations of two of 
the senses used by aircraft maintenance engineers in the course of their work. This 
section examines the way the information gathered by the senses is processed by 
the brain. The limitations of the human information processing system are also 
considered. 
Information processing is the process of receiving information through the senses, 
analyzing it and making it meaningful. 
2.9.3.1  An Information Processing Model 
Information processing can be represented as a model. This captures the main 
elements of the process, from receipt of information via the senses, to outputs such 
as decision making and actions. One such model is shown in Figure 2.10. 
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Figure 2.10 : A functional model of human information processing 
2.9.3.2  Sensory Receptors and Sensory Stores 
Physical stimuli are received via the sensory receptors (eyes, ears, etc.) and stored 
for a very brief period of time in sensory stores (sensory memory). Visual 
information is stored for up to half a second in iconic memory and sounds are stored 
for slightly longer (up to 2 seconds) in echoic memory. This enables us to remember 
a sentence as a sentence, rather than merely as an unconnected string of isolated 
words, or a film as a film, rather than as a series of disjointed images. 
2.9.3.3  Memory 
Memory is critical to our ability to act consistently and to learn new things Without 
memory, we could not capture a ‘stream’ of information reaching our senses, or 
draw on past experience and apply this knowledge when making decisions. 
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Memory can be considered to be the storage and retention of information, 
experiences and knowledge, as well as the ability to retrieve this information. 
Memory depends on three processes: 
• registration - the input of information into memory; 
• storage - the retention of information; 
• retrieval - the recovery of stored information. 
It is possible to distinguish between three forms of memory: 
a) ultra short-term memory (or sensory storage); 
b) short term memory (often referred to as working memory) 
c) long term memory. 
Ultra short-term memory has already been described when examining the role of 
sensory stores. It has duration of up to 2 seconds (depending on the sense) and is 
used as a buffer, giving us time to attend to sensory input. 
Short term memory receives a proportion of the information received into sensory 
stores, and allows us to store information long enough to use it (hence the idea of 
‘working memory’). It can store only a relatively small amount of information at one 
time, i.e. 5 to 9 (often referred to as 7 ±2) items of information, for a short duration, 
typically 10 to 20 seconds. As the following example shows, capacity of short term 
memory can be enhanced by splitting information in to ‘chunks’ (a group of related 
items). 
A telephone number, e.g. 01222555234, can be stored as 11 discrete digits, in 
which case it is unlikely to be remembered. Alternatively, it can be stored in chunks 
of related information, e.g. in the UK, 01222 may be stored as one chunk, 555 as 
another, and 234 as another, using only 3 chunks and therefore, more likely to be 
remembered. In mainland Europe, the same telephone number would probably be 
stored as 01 22 25 55 23 4, using 6 chunks. The size of the chunk will be 
determined by the individual’s familiarity with the information (based on prior 
experience and context), thus in this example, a person from the UK might 
recognize 0208 as the code for London, but a person from mainland Europe might 
not. 
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The duration of short term memory can be extended through rehearsal (mental 
repetition of the information) or encoding the information in some meaningful 
manner (e.g. associating it with something as in the example above). 
The capacity of long-term memory appears to be unlimited. It is used to store 
information that is not currently being used, including: 
• knowledge of the physical world and objects within it and how these  
behave; 
• personal experiences; 
• beliefs about people, social norms, values, etc.; 
• motor programmes, problem solving skills and plans for achieving various 
activities; 
• abilities, such as language comprehension. 
Information in long-term memory can be divided into two types: 
(i) semantic and 
(ii)episodic. 
Semantic memory refers to our store of general, factual knowledge about the world, 
such as concepts, rules, one’s own language, etc. It is information that is not tied to 
where and when the knowledge was originally acquired. Episodic memory refers to 
memory of specific events, such as our past experiences (including people, events 
and objects). We can usually place these things within a certain context. It is 
believed that episodic memory is heavily influenced by a person’s expectations of 
what should have happened, thus two people’s recollection of the same event can 
differ. 
Motor Programmes 
If a task is performed often enough, it may eventually become automatic and the 
required skills and actions are stored in long term memory. These are known as 
motor programmes and are ingrained routines that have been established through 
practice. The use of a motor programme reduces the load on the central decision 
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maker. An often quoted example is that of driving a car: at first, each individual 
action such as gear changing is demanding, but eventually the separate actions are 
combined into a motor programme and can be performed with little or no 
awareness. These motor programmes allow us to carry out simultaneous activities, 
such as having a conversation whilst driving. 
Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness is the synthesis of an accurate and up-to-date 'mental model' of 
one's environment and state, and the ability to use this to make predictions of 
possible future states. 
An example is an engineer seeing (or perceiving) blue streaks on the fuselage. His 
comprehension may be that the lavatory fill cap could be missing or the drainline 
leaking. If his situation awareness is good, he may appreciate that such a leak could 
allow blue water to freeze, leading to airframe or engine damage. 
Situation awareness for the aircraft maintenance engineer can be summarized as: 
• the status of the system the engineer is working on; 
• the relationship between the reported defect and the intended rectification; 
• the possible effect on this work on other systems; 
• the effect of this work on that being done by others and the effect of their 
work on this work. 
This suggests that in aircraft maintenance engineering, the entire team needs to 
have situation awareness - not just of what they are doing individually, but of their 
colleagues’ activities as well. 
2.9.3.4  Information Processing Limitations 
The basic elements of human information processing have now been explored. It is 
important to appreciate that these elements have limitations. As a consequence, the 
aircraft engineer, like other skilled professionals, requires support such as reference 
to written material (e.g. manuals). 
There are many well-known visual ‘illusions’ which illustrate the limits of human 
perception. Figure 2.11 shows how the perceptual system can be misled into 
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believing that one line is longer than the other, even though a ruler will confirm that 
they are exactly the same. 
 
Figure 2.11: The Muller-Lyer Illusion 
Figure 2.12 illustrates that we can perceive the same thing quite differently (i.e. the 
letter “B” or the number “13”). This shows the influence of context on our information 
processing. 
 
Figure 2.12: The importance of context. 
In aviation maintenance it is often necessary to consult documents with which the 
engineer can become very familiar. It is possible that an engineer can scan a 
document and fail to notice that subtle changes have been made. He sees only what 
he expects to see (expectation). To illustrate how our eyes can deceive us when 
quickly scanning a sentence, read quickly the sentence on in Figure 2.13. 
 
Figure 2.13: The effects of expectation 
At first, most people tend to notice nothing wrong with the sentence. Our perceptual 
system sub-consciously rejects the additional “THE”. 
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As an illustration of how expectation, can affect our judgement, the same video of a 
car accident was shown to two groups of subjects. One group was told in advance 
that they were to be shown a video of a car crash; the other was told that the car 
had been involved in a ‘bump’. Both groups were asked to judge the speed at which 
the vehicles had collided. The first group assessed the speed as significantly higher 
than the second group. 
Expectation can also affect our memory of events. The study outlined above was 
extended such that subjects were asked, a week later, whether they recalled seeing 
glass on the road after the collision. (There was no glass). The group who had been 
told that they would see a crash, recalled seeing glass; the other group recalled 
seeing no glass. 
Decision Making, Memory, and Motor Programmes 
a) Attention and perception shortcomings can clearly impinge on decision making. 
Perceiving something incorrectly may mean that an incorrect decision is made, 
resulting in an inappropriate action. Figure 2.14 also shows the dependence on 
memory to make decisions. It was explained earlier that sensory and short-term 
memory have limited capacity, both in terms of capacity and duration. It is also 
important to bear in mind that human memory is fallible, so that information: 
• may not be stored; 
• may be stored incorrectly; 
• may be difficult to retrieve. 
 
Figure 2.14: A model of human information processing [7] 
All these may be referred to as forgetting, which occurs when information is 
unavailable (not stored in the first place) or inaccessible (cannot be retrieved). 
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Information in short-term memory is particularly susceptible to interference, an 
example of which would be trying to remember a part number whilst trying to recall a 
telephone number. 
It is generally better to use manuals and temporary aides-memoires rather than to 
rely upon memory, even in circumstances where the information to be remembered 
or recalled is relatively simple. For instance, an aircraft maintenance engineer may 
think that he will remember a torque setting without writing it down, but between 
consulting the manual and walking to the aircraft (possibly stopping to talk to 
someone on the way), he may forget the setting or confuse it (possibly with a 
different torque setting appropriate to a similar task with which he is more familiar). 
Additionally, if unsure of the accuracy of memorised information, an aircraft 
maintenance engineer should seek to check it, even if this means going elsewhere 
to do so. Noting something down temporarily can avoid the risk of forgetting or 
confusing information. However, the use of a personal note book to capture such 
information on a permanent basis can be dangerous, as the information in it may 
become out-of-date. 
In the B737 double engine oil loss incident, the AAIB report stated: 
“Once the Controller and fitter had got to T2 and found that this supportive material 
[Task Cards and AMM extracts] was not available in the workpack, they would have 
had to return to Base Engineering or to have gone over to the Line Maintenance 
office to get it. It would be, in some measure, understandable for them to have a 
reluctance to recross the exposed apron area on a winter’s night to obtain a 
description of what they were fairly confident they knew anyway. However, during 
the course of the night, both of them had occasion to return to the Base 
Maintenance hangar a number of times before the task had been completed. Either 
could, therefore, have referred to or even drawn the task descriptive papers before 
the job was signed off. The question that should be addressed, therefore, is whether 
there might be any factors other than overconfidence in their memories, bad 
judgement or idleness which would dispose them to pass up these opportunities to 
refresh their memories on the proper and complete procedures.” 
2.9.4  Claustrophobia, Physical Access and Fear of Heights 
Although not peculiar to aircraft maintenance engineering, working in restricted 
space and at heights is a feature of this trade. Problems associated with physical 
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access are not uncommon. Maintenance engineers and technicians often have to 
access, and work in, very small spaces (e.g. in fuel tanks), cramped conditions 
(such as beneath flight instrument panels, around rudder pedals), elevated locations 
(on cherry-pickers or staging), sometimes in uncomfortable climatic or 
environmental conditions (heat, cold, wind, rain, noise). This can be aggravated by 
aspects such as poor lighting or having to wear breathing apparatus. 
2.9.4.1  Physical Access and Claustrophobia 
There are many circumstances where people may experience various levels of 
physical or psychological discomfort when in an enclosed or small space, which is 
generally considered to be quite normal. When this discomfort becomes extreme, it 
is known as claustrophobia. 
2.9.4.2  Fear of Heights 
Working at significant heights (See Figure 2.15) can also be a problem for some 
aircraft maintenance engineers, especially when doing ‘crown’ inspections (top of 
fuselage, etc.). Some engineers may be quite at ease in situations like these 
whereas others may be so uncomfortable that they are far more concerned about 
the height, and holding on to the access equipment, than they are about the job in 
hand. In such situations, it is very important that appropriate use is made of 
harnesses and safety ropes. These will not necessarily remove the fear of heights, 
but will certainly help to reassure the engineer and allow him to concentrate on the 
task in hand. The FAA’s hfskyway website provides practical guidance to access 
equipment when working at height. 
Shortly before the Aloha accident, during maintenance, the inspector needed ropes 
attached to the rafters of the hangar to prevent falling from the aircraft when it was 
necessary to inspect rivet lines on top of the fuselage. Although unavoidable, this 
would not have been conducive to ensuring that the inspection was carried out 
meticulously (nor was it, as the subsequent accident investigation revealed). The 
NTSB investigation report stated: 
“Inspection of the rivets required inspectors to climb on scaffolding and move along 
the upper fuselage carrying a bright light with them; in the case of an eddy current 
inspection, the inspectors needed a probe, a meter, and a light. At times, the 
inspector needed ropes attached to the rafters of the hangar to prevent falling from 
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the airplane when it was necessary to inspect rivet lines on top of the fuselage. Even 
if the temperatures were comfortable and the lighting was good, the task of 
examining the area around one rivet after another for signs of minute cracks while 
standing on scaffolding or on top of the fuselage is very tedious. After examining 
more and more rivets and finding no cracks, it is natural to begin to expect that 
cracks will not be found.” 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Engineer working on stand 
Managers and supervisors should attempt to make the job as comfortable and 
secure as reasonably possible (e.g. providing knee pad rests, ensuring that staging 
does not wobble, providing ventilation in enclosed spaces, etc.) and allow for 
frequent breaks if practicable. 
2.9.5  Circadian Rhythms 
Apart from the alternation between wakefulness and sleep, men have other internal 
cycles, such as body temperature and hunger/eating. These are known as circadian 
rhythms as they are related to the length of the day. 
An example of disrupting circadian rhythms would be taking a flight that crosses 
time zones. This will interfere with the normal synchronisation with the light and dark 
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(day/ night). This throws out the natural link between daylight and the body’s internal 
clock, causing jet lag, resulting in sleepiness during the day, etc. Eventually 
however, the circadian rhythm readjusts to the revised environmental cues. 
Figure 2.16 shows the circadian rhythm for body temperature. This pattern is very 
robust, meaning that even if the normal pattern of wakefulness and sleep is 
disrupted (by shift work for example), the temperature cycle remains unchanged. 
Hence, it can be seen that if you are awake at 4-6 o’clock in the morning, your body 
temperature is in a trough and it is at this time that is hardest to stay awake. 
Research has shown that this drop in body temperature appears to be linked to a 
drop in alertness and performance in man. 
 
Figure 2.16: The circadian rhythm for internal body temperature 
Although there are many contributory factors, it is noteworthy that a number of major 
incidents and accidents involving human error have either occurred or were initiated 
in the pre-dawn hours, when body temperature and performance capability are both 
at their lowest. These include Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Bhopal, as well as 
the BAC1-11, A320, and B737 incidents 
The engineer’s performance at this ‘low point’ will be improved if he is well rested, 
feeling well, highly motivated and well practised in the skills being used at that point. 
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2.10  Current Human Factor Programs in Aircraft Maintenance 
MRM (Maintenance Resource Management) which later evolved into Human 
Factors in Maintenance (HFIM) was developed to provide primarily the training 
required to understand and prevent HF errors from occurring. The main 
breakthrough that was achieved in recent years is the emphasis given by senior 
management in organizations to HF programs. Many consultants and companies 
have enjoyed this upward focus on HF. 
Several HFIM courses have evolved since ICAO required HFIM training which 
include those by the UK CAA, FAA as well as JAR compliant courses to ensure 
consistency and conformance to minimum standards set out by the governing 
bodies. A typical HFIM course such as the one developed to comply with JAR145 
includes: 
1. A General introduction to Human Factors 
2. Safety Culture/Organizational factors overview 
3. Human Performance, limitations and Human Error models 
4. Environmental issues impacting Human Performance 
5. Procedures, Information, Tools and Practices 
6. Professionalism, Integrity, Communication and Teamwork 
7. Organization HF program including the management of HF errors 
2.10.1  Dirty Dozen 
Gordon Dupont, formerly of Transport Canada, is one such consultant whose 
excellent “Dirty Dozen” classification of HF root causes has been widely adopted by 
several aviation organizations. These are encapsulated in a set of 12 posters, 
Figure 2.17 depicting cartoon scenarios showing what and how we should avoid it. 
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1- Lack of communication   2- Complacency 
   
3- Lack of knowledge    4- Distraction 
   
5- Lack of Team Work   6- Fatigue 
   
7- Lack of resources    8- Pressure 
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9- Lack of assertiveness   10- Stress 
   
 
11- Lack of awareness   12- Norms 
 
   
Figure 2.17 : “The Dirty Dozen.” From Gordon Dupont, System Safety Services 
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2.10.2  MEDA [20] 
Other organizations like Boeing have developed their own in-house Maintenance 
Error and Decision Analysis (MEDA) programs with more in depth analysis including 
the background of personnel that commit these HF errors to better understand the 
extent of solutions necessary. Most of these programs are designed to identify the 
HF errors, educate the personnel on their causal potential, suggest ways to contain 
and correct the problem and create a HF error-free environment. While many of 
these programs have truly made the aviation work environment safer, many of them 
still look at HF from a people’ perspective rather than “an organization” develop 
programs that improve the performance of which will provide long term solutions to 
HFIM. 
The MEDA Philosophy 
Traditional efforts to investigate errors are often aimed at identifying the employee 
who made the error. The usual result is that the employee is defensive and is 
subjected to a combination of disciplinary action and recurrent training (which is 
actually retraining). Because retraining often adds little or no value to what the 
employee already knows, it may be ineffective in preventing future errors. In  
addition, by the time the employee is identified, information about the factors that 
contributed to the error has been lost. Because the factors that contributed to the 
error remain unchanged, the error is likely to recur, setting what is called the "blame 
and train" cycle in motion again. 
To break this cycle, MEDA was developed in order to assist investigators to look for 
the factors that contributed to the error, rather than concentrate upon the employee 
who made the error. The MEDA philosophy is based on these principles: 
- Positive employee intent (maintenance technicians want to do the best 
job possible and do not make errors intentionally). 
- Contribution of multiple factors (a series of factors contributes to an 
error). 
- Manageability of errors (most of the factors that contribute to an error can 
be managed). 
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Positive Employee Intent 
This principle is key to a successful investigation. Traditional "blame and train" 
investigations assume that errors result from individual carelessness or 
incompetence. Starting instead from the assumption that even careful employees 
can make errors, MEDA interviewers can gain the active participation of the 
technicians closest to the error. When technicians feel that their competence is not 
in question and that their contributions will not be used in disciplinary actions against 
them or their fellow employees, they willingly team with investigators to identify the 
factors that contribute to error and suggest solutions. By following this principle, 
operators can replace a negative "blame and train" pattern with a positive "blame 
the process, not the person" practice. 
Contribution of Multiple Factors 
Technicians who perform maintenance tasks on a daily basis are often aware of 
factors that can contribute to error. These include information that is difficult to 
understand, such as work cards or maintenance manuals; inadequate lighting; poor 
communication between work shifts; and aircraft design. Technicians may even 
have their own strategies for addressing these factors. One of the objectives of a 
MEDA investigation is to discover these successful strategies and share them with 
the entire maintenance operation. 
Manageability Of Errors 
Active involvement of the technicians closest to the error reflects the MEDA principle 
that most of the factors that contribute to an error can be managed. Processes can 
be changed, procedures improved or corrected, facilities enhanced, and best 
practices shared. Because error most often results from a series of contributing 
factors, correcting or removing just one or two of these factors can prevent the error 
from recurring. 
The MEDA Process 
To help maintenance organizations achieve the dual goals of identifying factors that 
contribute to existing errors and avoiding future errors, Boeing initially worked with 
British Airways, Continental Airlines, United Airlines, a maintenance workers' labour 
union, and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. The result was a basic five-step 
process for operators to follow 
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• Event. 
• Decision. 
• Investigation. 
• Prevention strategies. 
• Feedback. 
Event 
An event occurs, such as a gate return or air turn back. It is the responsibility of the 
maintenance organization to select the error-caused events that will be investigated. 
Decision 
After fixing the problem and returning the airplane to service, the operator makes a 
decision: Was the event maintenance-related? If yes, the operator performs a 
MEDA investigation. 
Investigation 
Using the MEDA results form, the operator carries out an investigation. The trained 
investigator uses the form to record general information about the airplane, when 
the maintenance and the event occurred, the event that began the investigation, the 
error that caused the event, the factors contributing to the error, and a list of 
possible prevention strategies. 
Prevention Strategies 
The operator reviews, prioritises, implements, and then tracks prevention strategies 
(process improvements) in order to avoid or reduce the likelihood of similar errors in 
the future. 
Feedback 
The operator provides feedback to the maintenance workforce so technicians know 
that changes have been made to the maintenance system as a result of the MEDA 
process. The operator is responsible for affirming the effectiveness of employees' 
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participation and validating their contribution to the MEDA process by sharing 
investigation results with them. 
Management Resolve 
The resolve of management at the maintenance operation is key to successful 
MEDA implementation. Specifically, after completing a program of MEDA support 
from Boeing, managers must assume responsibility for the following activities before 
starting investigations: 
a) Appoint a manager in charge of MEDA and assign a focal organization. 
b) Decide which events will initiate investigations. 
c) Establish a plan for conducting and tracking investigations. 
d) Assemble a team to decide which prevention strategies to implement. 
e) Inform the maintenance and engineering workforce about MEDA before 
implementation. 
MEDA is a long-term commitment, rather than a quick fix. Operators new to the 
process are susceptible to "normal workload syndrome". This occurs once the 
enthusiasm generated by initial training of investigation teams has diminished and 
the first few investigations have been completed. In addition to the expectation that 
they will continue to use MEDA, newly trained investigators are expected to maintain 
their normal responsibilities and workloads. Management at all levels can maintain 
the ongoing commitment required by providing systematic tracking of MEDA findings 
and visibility of error and improvement trends. 
Summary 
The Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) process offered by Boeing continues 
to help operators of airplanes identify what causes maintenance errors and how to 
prevent similar errors in the future. Because MEDA is a tool for investigating the 
factors that contribute to an error, maintenance organizations can discover exactly 
what led to an error and remedy those factors. By using MEDA, operators can avoid 
the rework, lost revenue, and potential safety problems related to events caused by 
maintenance errors. 
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2.10.3  The Reason Model [17] 
Figure 2.18 depicts a modified version of the Reason model of accident causation, 
showing the various human contributions to the breakdown of a complex system 
(Reason, J. (1990) Human Error. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom). 
 
Figure 2.18 : James Reason's Model of Accident Causation (modified version, 
1990) 
Since its introduction in 1990, several variations have circulated among the Human 
Factors and accident prevention specialists, including a revised model by Professor 
Reason himself in 1993. This digest discusses the 1990 version, as included in 
ICAO Human Factors Digests No. 7 and No. 10. 
Professor Reason views the aviation industry as a complex productive system. One 
of the basic elements of the system is the decision-makers (high-level  anagement, 
the company's corporate or the regulatory body) who are responsible for setting  
goals and for managing available resources to achieve and balance two distinct 
goals: the goal of safety and the goal of on-time and cost-effective transportation of 
passengers and cargo. A second key element is line management — those who 
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implement the decisions made by upper management. For upper-management 
decisions and line management actions to result in effective and productive activities 
by the workforce involved, certain preconditions have to exist. For example, 
equipment must be available and reliable, the workforce has to be skilled, 
knowledgeable and motivated, and environmental conditions have to be safe. The 
final element, defences or safeguards, is usually in place to prevent foreseeable 
injury, damage or costly interruptions of service. 
The Reason model shows how humans contribute to the breakdown of complex, 
interactive and well-guarded systems — such as commercial aviation — to produce 
an accident. In the aviation context, “well-guarded” refers to the strict rules, high 
standards, inspection procedures and sophisticated monitoring equipment in place. 
Because of technological progress and excellent defences, accidents seldom 
originate exclusively from the errors of operational personnel (front-line operators) or 
as a result of major equipment failures. Instead, they result from interactions of a 
series of failures or flaws already present in the system. Many of these failures are 
not immediately visible, and they have delayed consequences. 
Failures can be of two types, depending on the immediacy of their consequences. 
An active failure is an error or a violation which has an immediate adverse effect. 
These errors are usually made by the front-line operator. A pilot raising the landing 
gear lever instead of the flap lever exemplifies this failure type. A latent failure is a 
result of an action or decision made well before an accident, the consequences of 
which may remain dormant for a long time. Such failures usually originate at the 
decision-maker, regulator or line management levels; that is, with people far 
removed in time and space from the event. A decision to merge two companies 
without providing training to standardize aircraft maintenance and flight operations 
procedures illustrates the latent failure type. These failures can also be introduced at 
any level of the system by the human condition, for example, through poor 
motivation or fatigue. 
Latent failures, which originate from questionable decisions or incorrect actions, 
although not harmful if they occur individually, can interact to create “a window of 
opportunity” for a pilot, air traffic controller or mechanic to commit an active failure 
which breaches all the defences of the system and results in an accident. In such 
cases, the front-line operators become the inheritors of a system's defects because 
they are the ones dealing with a situation in which their actions, technical problems 
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or adverse conditions will reveal the latent failures long embedded in a system. In a 
well-guarded system, latent and active failures will interact, but they will not often 
breach the defences. When the defences work, the result is an incident; when they 
do not, it is an accident. 
2.10.4  The SHEL Model [17] 
The “SHEL” model was first advocated by Professor Elwyn Edwards in 1972 and a 
modified diagram to illustrate the model was later developed by Capt. Frank 
Hawkins in 1975 (Figure 2.19). The component blocks of the SHEL model (the 
name being derived from the initial letters of its components: Software, Hardware, 
Environment, Liveware) are depicted with a pictorial impression of the need for 
matching the components. The following interpretations are suggested: liveware 
(human), hardware (machine), software (procedures, symbology, etc.) and 
environment (the conditions in which the L-H-S system must function). This block 
diagram does not cover interfaces which are outside Human Factors (e.g. between 
hardware-hardware; hardware-environment; software-hardware) and is intended 
only as an aid for understanding Human Factors. 
 
Figure 2.19 : The SHEL Model (adapted from Hawkins, 1975) 
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Liveware (or the human) is at the centre of the model. Human is generally 
considered the most critical as well as the most flexible component in the system. 
Yet people are subject to considerable variations in performance and suffer many 
limitations, most of which are now predictable in general terms. The edges of this 
block are jagged, and so the other components of the system must be carefully 
matched with them if stress in the system and eventual breakdown are to be 
avoided. In order to achieve this matching, an understanding of the characteristics of 
this central component is essential. Examples of those important characteristics are 
as follows: 
Physical size and shape. In the design of workplace and equipment, a vital 
consideration involves body measurements and movements, which may vary 
according to factors such as age, ethnicity and gender. Human Factors inputs must 
be provided at an early stage in the design process, and data for these inputs are 
available from anthropometry, biomechanics and kinesiology. 
Physical needs. People's requirements such as for food, water and oxygen are 
indicated in human physiology and biology. 
Input characteristics. Humans possess various sensory systems for collecting 
information from the world external as well as internal to them, enabling them to 
respond to events and to carry out the required task. All senses may, however, be 
subjected to degradation for one reason or another, and the sources of knowledge 
include psychology and physiology.  
Information processing. Again, these human functions have limitations. Poor 
instrument and alerting system design has frequently resulted from a failure to take 
into account the capabilities and limitations of human information processing. 
Factors such as stress, motivation and short- and long-term memory are involved. 
Psychology and cognitive sciences are the sources of background knowledge here. 
Output characteristics. Once information is sensed and processed, decisions are 
made and/or messages are sent to muscles to initiate the desired response. 
Responses may involve a physical control movement or the initiation of some form 
of communication. Acceptable control forces and direction of movement have to be 
known, and biomechanics, physiology and psychology provide the background 
knowledge. 
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Environmental tolerances. Environmental factors such as temperature, vibration, 
pressure, humidity, noise, time of day, amount of light and G-forces can affect 
human performance and well-being. Heights, enclosed spaces and a boring or 
stressful work environment can influence human behaviour and performance. 
Background information is available from medicine, psychology, physiology and 
biology. 
Liveware is the hub of the SHEL model of Human Factors. The remaining 
components must be adapted to and matched with this central component (Some of 
the descriptions of the model tend to be flight crew-oriented. This is because the 
model was initially developed to address interface problems in the cockpit 
environment). 
Liveware-Hardware. This interface is the most commonly considered when 
speaking of human-machine systems: the design of seats to fit the sitting 
characteristics of the human body; of displays to match the sensory and information-
processing characteristics of the user; of controls with proper movement, coding and 
location. The user may not be aware of an L-H deficiency, even when it finally leads 
to disaster, because the great virtue of human adaptability may mask the effects of 
such a deficiency. However, the deficiency continues to exist and may constitute a 
potential hazard. Ergonomics deals mostly, although not exclusively, with issues 
arising from this interface. 
Liveware-Software. This encompasses the interface between humans and the non-
physical aspects of the system such as procedures, manual and checklist layout, 
symbology and computer programmes. The problems may be less tangible than 
those involving the L-H interface and consequently more difficult to detect and 
resolve (e.g. misinterpretation of checklists or symbology). 
Liveware-Environment. The human-environment interface was one of the earliest 
recognized in aviation. Initially, measures taken were aimed at adapting the human 
to the environment (e.g. by using helmets, flying suits, oxygen masks and G suits). 
Later, attempts were made to alter the environment to match human requirements 
(e.g. by applying pressurization, air-conditioning and soundproofing). Today, new 
challenges have risen, notably ozone concentrations and radiation hazards at high 
flight levels, and the problems associated with disturbed biological rhythms and 
sleep because of high-speed transmeridian travel. Since illusions and disorientation 
are involved in many aviation occurrences, the L-E interface must also consider 
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perceptual errors induced by environmental conditions (e.g. illusions occurring 
during approach and landing). The aviation system operates within the context of 
broad managerial, political and economic constraints. These aspects of the 
environment will interact with the human via this interface. Although the 
modifications to these factors are generally beyond the function of Human Factors 
practitioners, they should be considered and addressed by those in management 
with the ability to do so. 
Liveware-Liveware. This is the interface between people. Flight crew training and 
proficiency testing have traditionally been conducted on an individual basis. If each 
individual crew member was proficient, then it was assumed that the team 
comprising those individuals would also be proficient and effective. This is not 
always the case, however, and for many years attention has been increasingly 
turned to the breakdown of teamwork. Flight crews function as groups and group 
interactions play a role in determining behaviour and performance. In this interface, 
one is concerned with leadership, crew cooperation, teamwork and personality 
interactions. Human Factors Digest No. 2 describes current industry approaches to 
deal with issues associated with this interface (i.e. CRM and LOFT programmes). 
Staff/management relationships are also within the scope of this interface, as 
corporate climate and company operating pressures can significantly affect human 
performance. Digest No. 2 also demon-strates the important role of management in 
accident prevention. 
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3  THE USED RESEARCH METHODS 
3.1  Definition of Six Sigma Methodology 
What is a sigma? 
Sigma is a Greek letter used as a symbol in statistics to represent the standard 
deviation or variation from the average or mean of a dataset. 
In a typical theory of evaluation, all things or processes; those that can be measured 
in a continuous scale (i.e. weight, height, and length) follow a normal or Gaussian 
distribution. 
The six sigma methodology uses this value, sigma, to measure and define the 
capabilities of a process. 
As the standard deviation decreases, the “sigma level” of your process increases; 
therefore, there are better controls and less defective products or services to the 
customer. 
What is Six Sigma? 
Use of statistical tools within a structured methodology for gaining the knowledge 
needed to create products and services better, faster and less expensively than the 
competition. 
Six Sigma is a business concept that answers customers’ demand for high quality 
and defect-free business processes. 
Six Sigma is a target (Fewer than 3.4 defects or errors per million opportunities – 
99.99966 perfection). 
Six sigma first focuses on the customer and meeting the customers’ needs. This can 
include both internal and external customers. Customers want creative, high quality 
services and goods at a reasonable cost. Without the customer, an organization, no 
matter how efficient or creative, cannot survive. 
What makes six sigma unique is that it does not just stay within the minds of the few 
who the projects directly affect; six sigma is a deep and positive cultural change for 
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the organization. The focus of six sigma is understood at all levels of the 
organization, especially the executive levels. 
Another key component to its success is also that six sigma is not just a method but 
also a positive and deep cultural change. The approach is to have the support at all 
levels of the organization. 
Consequently, the ultimate result to improved quality in products and services is that 
real financial gains impact the bottom line. This is the goal for all organizations. 
In summary, Six Sigma is about identifying/quantifying and eliminating the Hidden 
Factory through Defect Reduction and ultimately Design for 6 Sigma 
 
Figure 3.1 : Normal distribution 
Within the normal distribution, the premise behind 6 sigma is that there is an upper 
(USL) and lower limit (LSL) set. Anything outside of these limits would be 
considered defective. The premise of 6 sigma is to stay well within these limits by 
using proven methodologies to identify, quantify, and mostly, control or eliminate the 
sources of variation. 
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Figure 3.2 : Six Sigma is a defect rate of 3.4 per million; or an accuracy rate of 
greater than 99.99% 
On Figure 3.2, dark blue is less than one standard deviation from the mean. For the 
normal distribution, this accounts for 68% of the set. For the normal distribution, two 
standard deviations from the mean (blue and brown) account for 95%. For the 
normal distribution, three standard deviations (blue, brown and green) account for 
99.7%. 
In practice, one often assumes that the data are from an approximately normally 
distributed population. If that assumption is justified, then about 68% of the values 
are at within 1 standard deviation away from the mean, about 95% of the values are 
within two standard deviations and about 99.7% lie within 3 standard deviations. 
This is known as the "68-95-99.7 rule". 
Six standard deviations account for 99.99%. Many corporations have adopted this 
measure (known as Six Sigma) for Quality Control and try to achieve a defect rate of 
3.4 per million. 
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Table 3.1 : Six Sigma – Goal 
 
When comparing sigma, why choose six? In statistics, 3 sigma is the technically 
accepted standard for variation. Let’s look at what each sigma level means in terms 
of defects. As we can see on the above table, at one sigma, there are 691,462 
defects per million opportunities. For 3 sigma, that equates to 66,807 defects per 
million opportunities. At six sigma, one would have only 3.4 defects per million 
opportunities. 
 
Figure 3.3 : Six sigma practical meaning [6] 
In the practical sense, when considering critical processes, one can see the need to 
work towards six sigma because 3 sigma is no longer acceptable. If we cannot 
accept these defects, then the customer should not accept these defects also [6]. 
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Understanding the behavior of process variables and problems can be described in 
this chart. Within a given specification, the results can be off-target in one or more 
directions or can vary in all kinds of directions. The goal of six sigma is not only to 
reduce the spread in the variation but also to center it so that the customer can be 
assured high-quality, on target product/service to a very high degree of certainty. 
The six sigma methodology identifies the processes that are off-target and/or have a 
high degree of variation. The goal of six sigma is to change the process from off 
target and with lots of variations to on-target and with much less variation. 
 
Figure 3.4 : Six Sigma strategy 
There are two strategies for six sigma; 
1- DMAIC, and 
2- DMADV 
The DMAIC methodology, instead of the Design methodology, should be used when 
a product or process is in existence at the company but is not meeting customer 
specification or is not performing adequately. 
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DMAIC is; 
1- Define the project goals and customer (internal and external) 
2- Measure the process to determine current performance 
3- Analyze and determine the root cause(s) of the defects 
4- Improve the process by eliminating defects 
5- Control future process performance 
The definition for the DMADV is; A product or process is not in existence at the 
company and one needs to be developed. 
DMADV is; 
1- Define the project goals and customer (internal and external) 
deliverables 
2- Measure and determine customer needs and specifications 
3- Analyze the process options to meet the customer needs 
4- Design (detailed) the process to meet the customer needs 
5- Verify the design performance and ability to meet customer needs 
3.1.1  DMAIC 
Define Phase 
The first step is to define the process. It is important at this stage all members of the 
team understand the process. This gives a common foundation for the team 
activities.  Likewise, this is a good time to identify the outputs for measurement and 
the inspection and test. Also, at this stage, the team can estimate the sigma level at 
each stage. 
The project scope sets the boundaries and goals for the team. One of the first 
objectives is to establish a Problem statement which is specific and measurable. It 
can also state the current state, the impact of the current state in measurable means 
(such as cost), and be objective. 
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This helps to establish a common and clear understanding about the project. It is a 
key to involve not only the executive members. For most six sigma projects, the 
goals and objectives should be obtainable in a reasonable time period, from 3 
months to one year. Another common objective in most projects includes an 
improvement of 50% or better; in addition, monetary gains are sometimes set as 
objectives. For example, a project may be expected to save a minimum of $75,000; 
another project can have a minimal savings of ¼ million dollars. 
The project scope should also identify key milestones in terms of completion. If the 
project is not completed within 120-160 days, there should at least be a major 
milestone to maintain the energy and make the goals obtainable. Short time 
schedule for completing have an improved likelihood of success. 
Finally, the project must focus on identifying the customers, their needs and their 
requirements. In most processes, there are usually multiple customers; it is critical to 
determine all the customers, not just the final customer. The team can stratify the 
customer, maybe ranking them as primary, secondary, tertiary, etc. Different 
customers will have different but complementary needs; it is the integration of the 
different needs that makes the final product or service successful. Therefore, it is a 
key to understand the needs and the requirements of the customer. There is a 
distinction from needs and requirements. The need of a customer is the output that 
establishes the relationship between the supplier and the customer. 
In the first step of the strategy process, one must define the process, inputs and 
outputs. At this step, one selects the output characteristics and identifies key 
process input and output variables. 
One of the key tools for this step is process mapping. The importance of process 
mapping is to map what is REALLY going on, not just map what documents say 
should go on. It should capture ALL steps of the process. 
Process mapping identifies all value added and non-value added and process steps, 
process inputs, and process and product outputs and data collection points. The 
output is the variable or item or feature which is deemed critical by the “customer”. 
The inputs are any variable which impact the output. 
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Measurement Phase 
The second phase of the DMAIC method is the measurement phase. This phase is 
extremely important because one quantifies the existing capabilities.The 
measurement phase establishes the input/output variables, the capability of 
process, the defects and the sigma level of the process. It serves to verify that 
variation is due to the process and not the measurement system. 
The purpose of the measurement phase is to: 
• Identify and define defects 
• Identify key input variables (X’s) and key output variables (Y’s). This 
consequently, determines the relationship between the inputs and defects. 
• Document the existing process  or establish a data collection system for your 
X’s and Y’s if one does not exist 
• Evaluate measurement system or establish for each key output variable 
using cause and effects matrix, failure mode effects analysis, etc. 
So what is a defect? A defect is any nonconformance to the specifications.  In 
finding the problem, one has to know how to look for the appropriate problems. It is 
critical to understand the importance of defects. 
Measurement is a key step because it establishes the capability and needs. Often, 
people may underestimate this stage because they feel that the do not need to look 
beyond their current measurement system; however, it is very important to not fall 
into this easy trap. True inputs can be difficult to find; sometimes, the input is 
actually several layers back and is well hidden. Therefore, it is very important to 
recognize and understand that the outputs (Y’s) are determined by the inputs, the 
X’s. Like a complex math formula, the output Y is a function of many different input 
variables, X’s. 
Thus, if one knows enough about the X’s, one can more accurately predict Y without 
having to measure it. However, if one does not know much about the X’s, then one 
has to resort to inspection and testing. 
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In addition, controlling the X’s will reduce the variability in Y, which decreases the 
number of defects, cycle time, and possibly, eliminate/reduce non-value-added 
tasks such as inspection, testing, and rework. 
The measurement stage looks for defects per unit; notice that when one determines 
the six sigma level, it establishes the defects per million.  This number is the number 
that drives the plant-wide improvement. This number also allows one to benchmark 
within and across the companies. 
 
Figure 3.5 : The calculatıon formula for DPMO 
To calculate sigma level, one first needs to determine three items:  units, defects, 
and opportunities. Unit is the item produced or being serviced. Defect is any event 
that does not meet the customer’s requirements. Opportunity is a chance for a 
defect to occur. 
From these values, one can calculate the defects per million opportunities. The 
calculation for the DPMO is shown on Figure 3.5. Once the DPMO is determined, 
one can look at a sigma chart and estimate the sigma level. 
We have to remember that the goal of the six sigma is zero defects; therefore, the 
higher the sigma level, the lower the number of defects. 
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Table 3.2 : DPMO and Sigma Level 
 
Table 3.2 is the sigma level chart. As seen in the chart, the number DPMO 
establishes the sigma level for the process. Ideally, if we look at what would be the 
most desirable level, one would look at a sigma level of 7.5 to 8.0 defects per million 
opportunities. 
What makes six sigma different than other initiatives is that decisions and efforts are 
made from facts and data rather than “gut” feelings. For every action, there is a 
some method to quantify, not just qualify, its effect on the goals of the organization. 
Analyze Phase 
The third stage of the six sigma process improvement model is the Analyze phase. 
At that stage, once the baseline has been established, one must now determine why 
the problem exists. This phase establishes the baseline capability for potential and 
overall key output variables. 
Purposes of the Analysis Phase are; 
1- Establish baseline capability for key output variables (potential and overall) 
2- Examine both the process and data for analysis 
3- Determine and validate the root causation of project problem 
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4- To reduce the number of process input variables (x’s) to a manageable 
number 
5- To determine the presence of and potential elimination of uncontrolled 
variables 
In order to analyze the data and/or process, there are many different tools to use. 
Such analysis tools are capability studies, multi-vari, hypothesis testing, ANOVA 
(Analysis of Variables), DOE (Design of Experiment), histogram, Pareto, cause and 
effect and root cause analysis. These methods are used to narrow the inputs, X’s, 
that are truly causing the problems in the output. 
 
Figure 3.6 : Some of the Analyze Tools 
Improvement Phase 
The fourth stage is the improvement phase. At this stage the key variables that 
negatively affect the outputs that were identified in the analysis phase will be verified 
through a series of experiments. DOE Factorial experiments are also used to gain 
more knowledge about the main effects and interactive relationships. 
Control Phase 
The control phase is the last phase. Once the key variables have been identified 
and the improvements have been validated, the control plan for sustaining the gains 
must be developed and implemented. This plan needs to be specific with specific 
time frames and roles identified. The plan needs to be documented and 
communicated to all affected personnel. The plan should include methods to 
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continually monitor the long-term delivered capability and performance. Finally, the 
control plan verifies the benefits and cost savings of the project. Control techniques 
are used to ensure the changes to the processes can maintain the improvement. 
Then the team can establish and implement the changes for long-term control. 
Some of the common techniques for controlling the improvements are: establish a 
control plan, Statistical process control, mistake proofing, and automated controls. 
Project reviews should continually monitor the program to ensure that the 
organization/department is holding the gains. Ultimately, the goal is to design for six 
sigma. 
3.2 Understanding Human Factors concept with using Six Sigma 
Methodology 
As long as there is an activity or process that produces some sort of output, then six 
sigma can be applied to it. Output can be a physical product or information or 
concept. Within an organization, one can look at all the departments that this may 
include and some more. Unlike other methodologies, six sigma is not limited to only 
the manufacturing sector. All divisions in a department can benefit from using the 6 
sigma methodology. As long as there is a process with an output, then there is a 
place for six sigma, since every function has a customer and some deliverable to the 
customer. We have to remember, a customer can be both internal and external. 
In the following part (Part 4 of this thesis) the six sigma concept has been used to 
identify the root causes of the problem which are raised because of the human error. 
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4  APPLICATIONS AND RESULTS 
In this thesis I have had an opportunity to review the occurrences and findings data 
those have been listed in the files of the Quality Department of one of the certified 
private company in Turkiye as an aircraft and its components maintenance. 
The Six Sigma methods have been used to evaluate the data and eliminate the 
errors that have been resulted from the internal and external audits of the subjected 
company processes and products. 
To better understand the methods the followings have been documented for Six 
Sigma concept; 
Phase 1 Definition of the problem 
Phase 2 Measure of the problem 
Phase 3 Analyze the data 
Phase 4 Improve the process 
Phase 5 Control the corrected process 
From now on the above listed phases will be described for the data above 
mentioned. 
4.1   Phase 1- Definition of the problem 
An incident has occurred on the X type of aircraft (for the confidentiality of the 
occurrence and commercial data the details of the occurrences about the company 
name, aircraft type, manufacturer, registration and owner have not been mentioned). 
The aircraft was jacked for replacing of both main landing gear and nose gear 
dynamic and static seals by the chief inspector as requested by the work order. 
During lowering the aircraft, after oil seal change on main landing gears and nose 
landing gear aircraft stability was lost and aft jack cracked the fuselage skin at stage 
1338. Skin, aft pressure bulkhead and surround structure was damaged. The 
following pictures have been taken just after the occurrence. The maintenance 
center informed customer, civil aviation authority and the manufacturer of the 
aircraft. The manufacturer of the aircraft has sent an investigator team immediately 
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by customer request to analyze the cost of the corrective action of the 
occurrence/problem. The manufacturer of the aircraft has sent detailed prices as 
following; 
$ 1,230,000 for fixed price labor (this includes the damage survey), 
$ 188,000 for parts, 
$ 85,000 for airfare, 
$ 68,000 for freight for tooling and parts, 
Sum of the above cost would be $ 1,571,000. 
Customer decided to ground (not use) the aircraft. 
4.2  Phase 2 - Measurement of the problem 
The customer decided to ground the aircraft for the serviceable spare parts of other 
same type of the aircraft because of the cost of the maintenance since they have 
bought the aircraft for $2,500,000. 
 
Figure 4.1 : A view of the occurence 
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Figure 4.2 : A view of the occurence 
 
Figure 4.3 : A view of the occurence 
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Figure 4.4 : A view of the occurence 
 
Figure 4.5 : A view of the occurence 
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Figure 4.6 : A view of the occurence 
After the occurrence the quality department of the company set a team from the 
quality, engineering and maintenance department to investigate the occurrence and 
find out the route cause to prevent the reoccurrences. 
For this purpose followings have been documented on the investigation report; 
1- All structural task cards have been reviewed. It has been observed that all 
corrosion detected parts of the aircraft task cards have been released 
properly by the qualified technicians/certifying staff. 
2- All non routine cards of the aircraft have been reviewed after the test flight of 
the aircraft. All of the non routine cards have been documented that all of 
them released properly by the qualified technicians/certifying staff. 
3- The technicians who were working on the aircraft during the subjected 
maintenance were not qualified on the specified aircraft. They did not have 
the proper license to work on the subjected aircraft to perform the 
maintenance. 
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4- Similar task cards have been done before properly by the other maintenance 
staff many times properly. The licensed personnel were the main difference. 
5- Conclusion: It has been recorded that the occurrence was because of the 
human factor error. After the occurrence, the maintenance center decided to 
train all personnel about human factor errors. 
6- Corrective action: 1- Quality Manager trained all maintenance related 
personnel (523 people) on Human Factor Training. 2- The Training Manager 
and other qualified instructors trained 20 mechanics and 20 avionics on the 
subjected aircraft first. And after these trainings, the maintenance center 
instructed the maintenance personnel on the other aircraft types. 3- The 
Quality Department started more frequent audits on the maintenance 
personnel and products. 
4.3  Phase 3 - Analyze the data 
The followings are the data graphs those have been gathered from the Quality 
Department audit findings data of this company. The audit findings have been 
classified as listed on the following graph. The number of the findings has been 
indicated on the Y-axis of the graph and the classifications have been listed on the 
X-axis of the graph. 
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Figure 4.7 : Classification of the audit findings for 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. 
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Above graph, Figure 4.7, shows that the Human Factor is the statistically significant 
factor of the audit findings. The classifications of the findings have been done with 
the quality auditors’ team. The audit team has conducted audits during the years 
2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. They have added the external audits which have been 
done by the customers’ quality auditors externally. 
Table 4.1 : Classified root causes of the human errors 
2003 2004 2005 2006
1- Incorrect installation of components 23 61 63 15
2- Fitting the wrong parts 21 53 41 12
3- Electrical wiring discrepancies 19 52 50 10
4- Loose objects left in the aircraft 18 20 21 5
5- Inadequate lubrication 16 45 55 10
6- Cowlings, access panels, and fairing not secured 14 30 31 4
7- Fuel/oil caps and refuel panels not secure 14 13 4 1
8- Landing gear lock pins not removed before departure 11 9 5 0
9- Not following regulations or procedures 10 40 45 10
10- Equipment misuse or equipment defects 10 30 35 5
11- Organizational (supervision/discipline) 5 20 21 2
12- Behavior (misjudgment/misperception) 5 10 12 2
13- Physical Circumstances (night, etc.) 1 2 2 0
TOTAL 167 385 330 76  
Under Human Factors the followings were the classified root causes of the human 
errors (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.8); 
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Figure 4.8 . Classified root causes for the human factor findings 
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4.4  Phase 4 - Improve the process 
Since the statistically significant factor has been found that the root cause of the 
findings is human factors the Human Factors Training has been started for the 
maintenance personnel by the Quality Department of the company as of October 
2005. Quality Department initiated a Crew Coordination Concepts program “to equip 
all maintenance personnel with the skill to use all resources to improve safety and 
efficiency”. First year results were remarkable: 
- 523 employees received training (2/3 workforces) 
- Maintenance ground damage cost cut by 66% 
- Dramatically curtailed upward trend in injuries 
The next year (2006) audit findings showed that statistically significant root cause 
was still human factor; however the ratio was decreasing compared to the previous 
year. Of course the Human Factors training was not the main cause for the 
decreasing ratio. We should not disregard the other development factors like 
management decisions for hiring the right people, buying the required tool and 
constructing a new building for the maintenance personnel for their resting area 
during the break time of their work. All these positive developments helped to 
decrease the number of the findings in 2006 compared to 2003, 2004 and 2005 
(Figure 4.9). 
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Figure 4.9 : The number of the findings in 2006 compare to 2003, 2004 and 2005 
are decreased 
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The numbers of the audits have been calculated from the checklists. It has been 
assumed that each checklist which has been used during the audit has 10 questions 
as an average value. From this assumption, the following Table-4.2 has been used 
for the calculation of the sigma level of the company’s all processes; 
Table 4.2 : Data for calculation of the sigma levels 
Years 
Number Of 
Performed 
Audits 
Average Number 
of Questions For 
Each Of The Audit
Total 
Number Of 
Questions 
Total Number 
Of Findings 
DPMO 
Sigma 
Level
2003 36 10 360 167 463888.9 1,59 
2004 103 10 1030 385 373786.4 1,82 
2005 132 10 1320 330 250000.0 2,17 
2006 47 10 470 76 161702.1 2,49 
 
Figure 4.10 shows that by using chi-square test it is statistically significant that wach 
years’ number of audit findings are different.  
Figure 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 shows the level of the sigma for 2003, 2004, 2005 
and 2006. 
      Chi-Square Test           Hypotheses:
                Ho: All groups the same
               Ha: At least one different
Group Expected Chi-sq
2003 360 67 248.322 50.225
2004 1030 385 1426.923 110.411
2005 1320 330 1223.077 7.681
2006 470 76 281.678 125.906
Totals--------> 3180 858
294.223 <-------Chi-Sq
df---> 3 7.815 <---------Critical Chi-Sq
0.000 <--------- p-value
Total Number of 
Questions Total Number 
of Findings
 
Figure 4.10 : P value is less than 0.05 which means that each year’s audit status is 
statistically different than each other 
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Figure 4.11 : The Sigma Level for 2003 
 
Figure 4.12 : The Sigma Level for 2004 
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Figure 4.13 : The Sigma Level for 2005 
 
Figure 4.14 : The Sigma Level for 2006 
It is statistically significant that the sigma level of the audit status for the previous 
year has been increased. 
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4.5  Phase 5 - Control the corrected process 
In the control phase the Quality and the Training Departments worked together to 
implement the improve phase with the audit findings. 
Clearly the Quality Department of the maintenance company has bought into 
Maintenance Resource Management or “MRM”. Quality Department initiated a 
Human Factor Training program “to equip all maintenance personnel with the skill to 
use all resources to improve safety and efficiency.”  The two day workshop covers 
organizational routines, assertive behaviors, leadership styles, stress management, 
decision-making, and interpersonal skills. The results after the first year of Human 
Training Program were remarkable: 
• 523 out of the targeted 523 personnel received training which means 
all trained 
• Maintenance ground damage costs were reduced by 66% 
• Occupational injuries were down 27% 
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5  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
As the nature of human is variable depending on many factors, a systematic 
approach to measure the performance and reduce errors is very difficult. However 
this is essential for reducing human factors in aircraft maintenance errors. As the 
basic approach in six sigma methodology is “if you can not measure it, you can not 
improve it”, this thesis identifies human factors as the “Y” of the problem and tries to 
identify probable causes of human factor errors, or in six sigma terminology, 
problem “X”s. This sets up a methology to analyse human factor errors in aircraft 
maintenance using the six sigma approach. Using this approch a sample real life 
problem is defined and as a result of this very significant accident, human factor 
errors are analyzed by evaluating the data on findings as a result of audits 
conducted by QA department and the identified solution is implemented such that 
the improvements are also visible and permanent. 
This thesis also shows that human factors in aircraft maintenance are a very critical 
element to consider in reducing maintenance errors. What is shown here is that the 
old school approach of “fire the technician who did the error” is not the right way to 
resolve the problem. The more effective way is to evaluate the reasons, namely the 
“why”s of that human factor in the error and reduce or eliminate the reasons 
underlying such that this error or similar errors will not occur whoever the person 
conducting the maintenance action is. To do this, a systematic approach works the 
best, also to reduce the variation in analyzing the problem from case to case. For 
this reason, it is shown that six sigma methodoly is not only effective for 
manufacturing environment problems but also very useful for human factor analysis 
in aircraft maintenance. 
It is presented in the previous studies that human factors had been a subject where 
various other solution methods had been presented before. The basic difference of 
this study is that it uses the six sigma methodology which allows: 
- only 3.4 defects per million opportunities that is an acceptable standart for 
aviation assuming realistically that zero defect is not possible, which is a number 
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that not only evaluates short term performance but also takes into consideration the 
long term shift in fixed systems, 
- it is a measurement based technique where the probability of biased 
analysis due to human involvement is minimized, where an example is that the 
errors in maintenance are not evaluated as single events by named persons but as 
a sample of a much larger population of events, 
- and uses statistical tools to analyze the data that results in a realistic 
solution by means of considering the variations possible from the obtained data 
where an example to this is that there is always a minimum number of data points 
required to obtain a statisitcaly significant result, and the more data availible, the 
more reliable analysis is possible, resulting in an engineering oriented solution for 
human factors in aircraft maintenance. 
Relying on the fact that most of the management personel in aviation maintenance 
has an engineering background, this approach could prove to be easy to understand 
and widely applicable to human factors analysis in aircraft maintenance. 
Again, the best way to promote Human Factors awareness is by training. There are 
a host of other HF briefs and resources available from military and civilian safety 
and aviation agencies. 
- An effective operational risk assessment process 
- Incorporate HF into safety program 
- HF council/board 
- Ongoing HF training for all personnel 
Devoting time and resources to Human Factors as a stand-alone program may 
prove inefficient and administratively burdensome. However, a structured Human 
Factors program does fit very well under the umbrella of the Organization’s 
Operational Risk Management process (ORM). 
The intent of ORM is to minimize risk associated with maintenance safety. As we 
have already seen, problems with the human link in the operational chain may 
present the greatest risk or set of risks to operational readiness. To date, there have 
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been many examples documenting the outstanding success of ORM. In this regard, 
it becomes paramount that safety personnel become ORM specialists. 
Another way to ensure that Human Factors programs can be promulgated is by 
incorporating one into an organization’s Safety program. This does not require any 
added administrative processes. Rather, incorporation of a Human Factors 
necessitates an ongoing program of training and awareness. 
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APPENDIX 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Accident 
An aviation accident is an occurrence on board an aircraft resulting in injury or death 
to one or more persons. 
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board definition of an aviation accident is 
as follows: 
An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all 
such persons have disemboweled. 
Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) 
Due to the increasing complexity of new aircraft, maintenance is becoming a more 
critical function. In the early days of aviation, aircraft maintenance was considered a 
higher level of automotive maintenance not far removed from that of an automobile 
and similar skills could be successfully employed in either endeavour. Such 
consideration could not survive for long as aircraft technology quickly developed into 
a much more complex technology. Today aircraft maintenance technicians must 
know a good deal about system theory, be able to perform complex tests and 
interpret results, maintain structural elements that differ greatly from typical riveted 
aluminum structures and evaluate sensitive electronic and automated systems 
where a mistaken application of the simplest task can cause considerable loss in 
damage. Trends in aircraft and systems development clearly indicate that future 
aircraft technicians, in order to perform successfully, will need to be highly educated 
and trained to the level of a degree in engineering or its equivalent. 
Aviation Incident 
An aviation incident is an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the 
operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations. 
Other countries adopt a similar approach, although there are minor variations, such 
as to the extent of aviation-related operations on the ground, covered, as well as 
with respect to the thresholds beyond which an injury is considered serious or the 
damage is considered substantial. 
Chi Square Test 
A chi square test, also called "test of association", is a statistical test of association 
between discrete variables. It is based on a mathematical comparison of the number 
of observed counts with the number of expected counts to determine if there is a 
difference in output counts based on the input category. Use with Defects data 
(counts) & defectives data (how many good or bad). Critical Chi-Square is Chi-
squared value where p=.05. 
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Data 
Data is factual information used as a basis for reasoning, discussion, or calculation; 
often this term refers to quantitative information 
Defect 
A defect is any nonconformity in a product or process; it is any event that does not 
meet the performance standards of a Y. 
Defective 
The word defective describes an entire unit that fails to meet acceptance criteria, 
regardless of the number of defects within the unit. A unit may be defective because 
of one or more defects. 
Discrete Data 
Discrete data is information that can be categorized into a classification. Discrete 
data is based on counts. Only a finite number of values is possible, and the values 
cannot be subdivided meaningfully. For example, the number of parts damaged in 
shipment produces discrete data because parts are either damaged or not 
damaged. 
DPMO 
Defects per million opportunities (DPMO) is the number of defects observed during 
a standard production run divided by the number of opportunities to make a defect 
during that run, multiplied by one million. 
EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) 
Civil Aviation Authority of the European Union 
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) 
Civil Aviation Authority of the United States of America 
General aviation 
All flying by civil aircraft other than high capacity air transport aircraft, gliders and 
sport aviation. 
Hull-Loss Accident 
A hull-loss accident is one where the damage to the plane is such that it must be 
written off, or in which the plane is totally destroyed. 
IATA 
The International Air Transport Association - was founded in Havana, Cuba, in April 
1945. It is the prime vehicle for inter-airline cooperation in promoting safe, reliable, 
secure and economical air services - for the benefit of the world's consumers. The 
international scheduled air transport industry is now more than 100 times larger than 
it was in 1945. Few industries can match the dynamism of that growth, which would 
have been much less spectacular without the standards, practices and procedures 
developed within IATA. At its founding, IATA had 57 Members from 31 nations, 
mostly in Europe and North America. Today it has over 270 Members from more 
than 140 nations in every part of the globe. 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) 
The ICAO is the UN (United Nations)'s technical agency for aviation which 
establishes international standards and recommends practices for aircraft 
operations and maintenance.  
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JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) 
Joint Civil Aviation Authorities of the civil aviation. 
JAR OPS Part 1 (JAR OPS1) 
JAR-OPS Part 1 prescribes requirements applicable to the operation of any civil 
aeroplane for the purpose of commercial air transportation by any operator whose 
principal place of business and is in a JAA Member State. 
Maintenance area 
A general locality in which are grouped a number of maintenance activities for the 
purpose of retaining or restoring material to a serviceable condition. 
Maintenance engineering 
The application of techniques, engineering skills, and effort, organized to ensure that 
the design and development of aircraft systems and equipment provide adequately 
for their effective and economical maintenance. 
Maintenance (material) 
1. All action taken to retain material in a serviceable condition or to restore it to 
serviceability. It includes inspection, testing, servicing, and classification as 
to serviceability, repair, rebuilding, and reclamation. 
2. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its 
mission. 
3. The routine recurring work required to keep a facility (plant, building, 
structure, ground facility, utility system, or other real property) in such 
condition that it may be continuously used at its original or designed capacity 
and efficiency for its intended purpose. 
Make safe 
One or more actions necessary to prevent or interrupt complete function of the 
system (traditionally synonymous with “dearm,” “disarm,” and “disable”). Among the 
necessary actions are: 
1. install (safety devices such as pins or locks);  
2. disconnect (hoses, linkages, batteries); 
3. bleed (accumulators, reservoirs); 
4. remove (explosive devices such as initiators, fuzes, detonators); and 
5. intervene (as in welding, lockwiring). 
Maintenance status 
1. A non-operating condition, deliberately imposed, with adequate personnel to 
maintain and preserve installations, material, and facilities in such a 
condition that they may be readily restored to operable condition in a 
minimum time by the assignment of additional personnel and without 
extensive repair or overhaul. 
2. That condition of material that is in fact, or is administratively classified as, 
unserviceable, pending completion of required servicing or repairs. 
3. A condition of material readiness that reports the level of operational 
readiness for a piece of equipment. 
P-Value 
The p-value represents the probability of concluding (incorrectly) that there is a 
difference in the samples when no true difference exists. It is a statistically 
calculated by comparing the distribution of given sample data and an expected 
distribution and is dependent upon the statistical test being performed. For example, 
if two samples are being compared in a t-test, a p-value of 0.05 means that there is 
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only 5% chance of arriving at the calculated t value if the samples were not different 
(from the same population). In other words, a p-value of 0.05 means there is only a 
5% chance that you would be wrong in concluding the populations are different. P-
value < 0.05 = safe to conclude there's a difference. P-value = risk of wasting time 
investigating further. 
Sigma 
The Greek letter s (sigma) refers to the standard deviation of a population. Sigma, or 
standard deviation, is used as a scaling factor to convert upper and lower 
specification limits to Z. Therefore, a process with three standard deviations 
between its mean and a spec limit would have a Z value of 3 and commonly would 
be referred to as a 3 sigma process. 
SHY145, JAR 145 and IR Part 145 
These documents establish the requirements to be met by an organisation to qualify 
for the issue or continuation of an approval for the maintenance of aircraft and 
components. 
SHY66, JAR 66 and IR Part 66 
For the purpose of documents, the competent authority shall be the authority 
designated by the civil Aviation Authority to whom a person applies for the issuance 
of an aircraft maintenance licence. 
Training 
Activity under the supervision of an appropriate instructor for the purpose of practical 
instruction for the issue or renewal of a licence or rating. Includes aircraft type 
endorsement/conversion and navigation exercises conducted as part of a course of 
the training. 
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